Emory Law Journal
Volume 62
Issue 4 The 2012 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium — Innovation for the Modern Era: Law,
Policy, and Legal Practice in a Changing World
2013

Making Knowledge and Making Drugs? Experimenting with
University Innovation Capacity
Liza Vertinsky
Emory University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Liza Vertinsky, Making Knowledge and Making Drugs? Experimenting with University Innovation Capacity,
62 Emory L. J. 741 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol62/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1

6/3/2013 10:13 AM

MAKING KNOWLEDGE AND MAKING DRUGS?
EXPERIMENTING WITH UNIVERSITY INNOVATION
CAPACITY
Liza Vertinsky∗
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 741
I. THE PRODUCTIVITY CRISIS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY ..... 747
A. The Traditional Approach to Drug Development ....................... 748
B. The Need for Change .................................................................. 753
C. Public and Private Sector Responses Impacting University
Roles ........................................................................................... 758
II. EXPERIMENTING WITH UNIVERSITY INNOVATION CAPACITY ............ 768
A. Comparative Advantages of Universities as Drug Developers .. 770
B. University Experiments with Changing Roles in
Pharmaceutical Innovation ........................................................ 780
III. A CASE STUDY: EMORY UNIVERSITY AS DRUG DEVELOPER ............. 790
A. The Organizational Framework ................................................. 792
B. Analysis of This Approach .......................................................... 800
IV. LEGAL RESPONSES TO A CHANGING UNIVERSITY ROLE .................... 808
CONCLUSION................................................................................................... 821
INTRODUCTION
The innovation process for novel medical therapies needs repair.1 The
United States spends more than ever before on drug discovery without a
∗

Associate Professor, Emory University School of Law. Special thanks to Paul Heald, Timothy R.
Holbrook, Bill Church, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Chris Holman, Kevin Outterson, Cynthia Ho, Yaniv Heled,
Emily Morris, Jacob Rooksby, and Benjamin Liu for valuable comments. Special thanks also to Dennis C.
Liotta, Stephen D. Sencer, Jack Tillman, Susanne Hollinger, and Todd Sherer for sharing their comments,
ideas, and work on Drug Innovation Ventures at Emory (DRIVE), to Abigail Rives and Rachel Erdman for
their research assistance, and to the editors of the Emory Law Journal for their editorial contributions. While
this paper and my broader project on universities and innovation respond to and benefit from the ideas shared,
all views and in particular all shortcomings are my own.
1 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
(2006) (examining concerns about the productivity of the pharmaceutical industry, including escalating
spending and declining trends in the number of new drugs approved); Francis S. Collins, Commentary,
Reengineering Translational Science: The Time Is Right, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., July 6, 2011, at 1. But
see Iain M. Cockburn, Is the Pharmaceutical Industry in a Productivity Crisis?, 7 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON.
1, 1 (2006) (suggesting that the productivity crisis may be overstated, but agreeing that changes are needed,
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corresponding increase in new medical therapies.2 Despite major advances in
knowledge concerning the underlying mechanisms of disease and new
technologies for drug discovery and design, there have been few significant
changes in the treatment of disease.3 While this productivity crisis may be due
in part to a move beyond low-hanging fruit and toward the pursuit of more
complex and elusive therapies, inefficiencies inherent in the current system of
pharmaceutical innovation are also to blame.4 The segmented, proprietary
model of drug development that has dominated the pharmaceutical industry for
decades is becoming not only increasingly undesirable, but also unsustainable.5
Federal and state governments are reluctant to devote their shrinking budgets
to basic research without more and faster tangible returns, private investors are
unwilling to absorb the cost and risk involved in moving from early-stage
discovery to later development stages, and pharmaceutical companies are
retrenching their development efforts in response to soaring costs and a dearth
of new blockbuster drug candidates. Pharmaceutical companies miss
opportunities to control costs and reduce error rates because of failures to share
particularly “[p]olicies that make ‘small’ markets more attractive, build capacity in translational medicine,
reduce the cost, time, and uncertainty of regulatory review, maximize access to basic research, and encourage
greater cooperation and collaborative research within the industry”). This Article focuses on the discovery and
development of new drugs, but similar issues and opportunities arise in the discovery and development of
other medical therapies, diagnostics, and medical devices.
2 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved approximately the same number of drugs in
2008 that were approved in 1950, while at the same time the cost of funding has continued to rise—some
suggest by as much as 13.4% annually. See Bernard Munos, Lessons from 60 Years of Pharmaceutical
Innovation, 8 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 959, 959, 962 (2009).
3 While there are about 4,500 conditions with defined molecular causes, for example, therapies now
exist for only about 250 of them. The National Institutes of Health—A Review of Its Reforms, Priorities, and
Progress: Hearing Before the Health Subcomm. of the H. Energy & Commerce Comm., 112th Cong. 12 (2012)
(statement of Francis S. Collins, Director, National Institutes of Health).
4 See, e.g., Huda Y. Zoghbi, The Basics of Translation, 339 SCIENCE 250 (2013) (suggesting that the
failure to translate scientific discoveries into effective treatments is largely due to the “complexity of human
physiology, and our limited understanding of how the vast majority of genes, proteins, and RNAs work”); see
also Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004,
at 10; Collins, supra note 1; Praful Mehta & Sophia Walker, Cardiovascular R&D Model—Increasing
Innovation?, IHS HEALTHCARE & PHARMA BLOG (Jan. 29, 2013), http://healthcare.blogs.ihs.com/2013/01/29/
cardiovascular-rd-model-increasing-innovation/ (“In light of the high value-driven product development
environment, the hard-coded blockbuster strategy has become completely futile with increasing probabilities
of failure. . . . [I]t [is] not the technology or the markets that [are] to blame here, but the broader innovation
strategy.”).
5 See, e.g., Fabio Pammolli et al., The Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10 NATURE REVS.
DRUG DISCOVERY 428, 428 (2011) (discussing an empirical examination of the decline in pharmaceutical
productivity and its determinants); Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Grand Challenge, 9 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 203 (2010) (describing
the productivity crisis in the pharmaceutical industry and examining the contributions of each step in the R&D
process to overall productivity).
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costly and valuable information, such as toxicology results and other
information about drug candidate failures.6 Inadequate investments in industrywide process innovations, such as increasing data transparency and pooling
discovery resources, lead to further missed opportunities to improve
productivity. The promises that scientific advances in the understanding of
disease offer for improving the treatment of disease seem increasingly out of
reach, leading some members of Congress to question the significant
investments being made in biomedical research.7
Nobody is happy with a situation in which the cost of drug discovery is
increasing while the number of novel drugs approved for human use is flat or
falling.8 In response, federal and even state government policy makers are
scrambling to retool the innovation process for medical therapies in ways that
will deliver faster, better, and more cost-effective results.9 They are focusing in
particular on strategies for increasing the speed and effectiveness of translating
scientific knowledge into new medical technologies.10 Pharmaceutical
companies are joining in the search for new innovation models as expiring
patents on blockbuster drugs and thinning drug pipelines threaten their existing
business models.11 In the pursuit of improved and cheaper ways to produce
new drugs, both groups are turning to universities, traditionally the sources of
early-stage drug discovery, to play an expanded role in the post-discovery drug

6

See, e.g., Julia Kollewe, Pharmaceuticals Struggle to Find Next Blockbuster Drugs as R&D Costs
Soar, GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/nov/21/pharmaceuticals-drugresearch-costs-rise (“[T]he pharmaceutical R&D sector can do more to work together, for example, sharing
knowledge on the science behind failed molecules and studies will help improve success rates, and ultimately
bring down the cost to develop new medicines.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7 See, e.g., JOHN F. SARGENT JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42410, FEDERAL RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT FUNDING: FY2013 (2012).
8 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
3 (2006).
9 See Collins, supra note 1, at 1.
10 Id. Attention is focused in particular on what is often referred to as the “valley of death.” The valley of
death refers to the part of the innovation process that begins with post-discovery development and moves
through to later stages of product development. For a discussion of the valley of death in the drug discovery
context, see Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for
Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2008), which offers a strategy for
addressing the valley of death in drug discovery and development that separates upstream research on
promising genes, proteins, and biological pathways from downstream drug candidates. While this Article
focuses on the movement from biological research to the development of drugs, the ideas have broader
application to other fields that involve a complex combination of research and development efforts and often
risky and lengthy product development timelines, such as nanotechnology. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 1, at
1–2.
11 See Daniel Cressey, Traditional Drug-Discovery Model Ripe for Reform, 471 NATURE 17, 17 (2011).
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development process. As a result of financial pressures and the lure of new
funding and research opportunities, many of the larger U.S. research
universities are reconsidering the roles that they play in the innovation process
and experimenting with new ways of moving into spaces traditionally reserved
for commercial actors.12 In doing so, they are pushing against implicit
boundaries in the legal framework governing technology transfer and
challenging traditional views of universities as sites for disinterested discovery
and dissemination of public knowledge.
This Article begins with the challenges that face the pharmaceutical
industry and the related pressures on universities and investigates two
questions. First, the Article considers whether universities offer any advantages
over firms and governments in managing not only drug discovery, but also
post-discovery drug development. Second, this Article considers the
implications of an expanded university role in drug development for the
existing institutional framework governing university technology development
and transfer. The Article uses an experiment with drug development capacity
currently underway at Emory University as a case study with which to explore
these questions. This experiment takes Emory much further along the path of
drug development than most universities have ventured. It relies on Emory’s
ability to create and manage a number of separate but closely related public
knowledge and proprietary development projects within a single organizational
system. The case study illustrates the comparative advantages that the
university, as a unique organizational form, might offer over firms and
government labs in managing drug development. At the same time, the case
study illustrates the challenges of protecting the public interest in access to and
use of publicly funded research results without jeopardizing product
development goals. The Article concludes that the governance structure of the
university may offer certain advantages over both government and industry in
managing the kinds of translational research and development activities that
are becoming a critical part of downstream drug development.13 But realizing

12 Fiscal challenges are forcing many, if not most, higher education institutions to rethink their purpose
and modes of operation. The nature and direction of the changes taking place will, or at least should, vary
tremendously based on existing institutional capabilities and strengths. This Article focuses on the shifts taking
place in universities with well-established biomedical research capabilities, particularly those with existing
experience in drug discovery. This limits the focus to a relatively small number of large U.S. research
universities, primarily those with significant NIH and National Science Foundation (NSF) funding.
13 See, e.g., Julie Frearson & Paul Wyatt, Drug Discovery in Academia: The Third Way?, 5 EXPERT
OPINION ON DRUG DISCOVERY 909 (2010) (suggesting opportunities that universities offer for creating new
drug discovery paradigms). But see R. L. Juliano, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Public Policy: The Case for
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the potential of these advantages may require changes in the legal and
regulatory framework governing universities and their involvement in
processes of innovation.14
In the current economic and political environment, it is highly likely that
some of the largest research universities, which are also the recipients of the
bulk of federal research funding,15 will continue to experiment with expanded
roles in product development.16 This experimentation will exacerbate existing
tensions between public science and private development interests in a way
that merits a thoughtful policy response. Instead of leaving the regulation of
development activities to an outdated technology transfer framework, the law
should address the tensions between open science and proprietary development
directly.17 Existing rules and regulations need to be sufficiently flexible to
accommodate alternative models of university activity that permit at least some
a New Strategy for Drug Discovery and Development, 40 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2013) (suggesting
creation of nonprofit drug development corporations as an alternative approach).
14 Throughout this Article I use the term university loosely to include both universities and academic
medical centers, some of which are highly integrated into their affiliated universities and some of which
remain fairly autonomous. Most academic medical centers are owned by their affiliated universities and have a
reporting structure that involves oversight by the university. But the relationship between academic medical
centers and the rest of the university is one that needs further exploration in the context of the changing
university role and appropriate legal structure explored here. See generally Arthur S. Levine et al., The
Relationship Between the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine and the University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center—A Profile in Synergy, 83 ACAD. MED. 816 (2008); Joseph V. Simone, Understanding
Academic Medical Centers: Simone’s Maxims, 5 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 2281 (1999) (illustrating, through a
personal account of working within an academic medical center, the many different organizational challenges
of an institution with combined goals of research, patient care, and revenue).
15 See, e.g., NIH Awards by Location & Organization, NIH RES. PORTFOLIO ONLINE REPORTING TOOLS,
http://report.nih.gov/award/index.cfm (last updated Apr. 29, 2013); see also CHRISTINE M. MATTHEWS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41895, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH (2012); Brandon Glenn, Top NIH
Grant Funding by Institutions, States for 2010, MEDCITY NEWS (Mar. 7, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://medcitynews.
com/2011/03/top-nih-grant-funding-by-institutions-states-for-2010/.
16 The combination of increasingly expansive industry–academic partnerships, funding pressures
requiring public–academic–private collaborations, continued investment by policy makers in fostering
translational research capacity at universities, and changing skill sets and research and development
capabilities within the university make this a shift that is likely to continue for quite some time. See, e.g.,
Shreefal Mehta, Commentary, The Emerging Role of Academia in Commercializing Innovation, 22 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 21 (2004).
17 As used in this paper, the “public knowledge” function of the university refers to the mission-driven
roles of academic research universities to “create, preserve, teach, and apply knowledge” for the public good.
See University Mission Statement, EMORY U., http://www.emory.edu/president/governance/mission_statement.
html (last visited May 8, 2013). Both public and private research universities receive significant public
support, including direct funding, special tax treatments, and philanthropic support, in return for their
commitment to these public knowledge functions. For example, consider Emory University’s mission, which
should be kept in mind when we discuss the Emory experiment in Part III of this Article: “Emory University’s
mission is to create, preserve, teach, and apply knowledge in the service of humanity.” Id.
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kinds of proprietary drug development activity. But they also need to provide
for greater transparency, accountability, and responsibility on the part of the
university in the use of public funds and the safeguard of public knowledge.18
The primary piece of legislation dealing directly with universities and their
management of the fruits of federally funded research is the Bayh–Dole Act,
passed in 1980 as an amendment to the U.S. Patent Act.19 The nonprofit tax
status of research universities brings with it additional obligations on the
management and use of university resources,20 and publicly owned universities
have still another layer of regulation.21 As a first step in adapting the legal
framework to changing university roles, I suggest some modest changes to the
Bayh–Dole Act and related tax rules that are designed to enhance the
governance advantages of the university in mixed processes of scientific
research and drug development. The patent-focused, technology-transferoriented mandate of the Bayh–Dole Act should be replaced with a broader
mandate of managing and supporting innovation in the public interest.
Flexibility in the types of income that can be earned and the ways in which
Bayh–Dole funds can be used should be accompanied by university
monitoring, disclosure, and reporting requirements designed to increase the
transparency, accountability, and responsibility of universities in the
management of drug development activities. Universities should have clear
guidelines about how the funds they receive from drug development activities
can be used and the volume of development-versus-research activities that they
can engage in. Collective action problems among competing universities with a
shared interest in open access to scientific knowledge should be addressed
through limits on the use of patents in ways that impede competing research
efforts.

18 The need for greater accountability in the management of federally funded research was highlighted in
a recent National Academies report on university management of intellectual property. See NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2011); see also Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat,
Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded Research, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 953 (2012) (finding
underreporting of federal funding by universities).
19 See Bayh–Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6, 94 Stat. 3015, 3018–27 (1980) (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)).
20 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
21 Most public universities are founded and operated by state government entities, and they are subject to
state-specific laws. For a list of major public and land-grant institutions and descriptions of issues specific to
public universities, see ASS’N PUB. & LAND-GRANT U., http://www.aplu.org (last visited May 8, 2013).
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Part I of this Article begins by describing the challenges facing modern
drug development and the pressures that government and industry are placing
on universities to expand their role in drug development. Part II explains why
universities with existing drug discovery capabilities might have a comparative
advantage in undertaking the kinds of mixed discovery and development
efforts that are needed to reinvigorate pharmaceutical innovation. This
advantage will be particularly large in areas of pharmaceutical innovation
where the benefits to science and the satisfaction of unmet medical needs are
not accompanied by expectations of a blockbuster drug. It goes on to examine
some of the current experiments with expanding university innovation
capacity. Part III investigates the shifting role of the university through the lens
of an experiment in drug development currently underway at Emory
University. This Part explores the intertwined organizational and legal
structure and some of the motivating goals and assumptions underlying this
project, and then considers the implications of this changing university role for
the existing institutional framework governing universities and technology
transfer. Part IV suggests potential directions of change in the legal framework
designed to support and improve university governance of universitycontrolled drug development activities. While recognizing the opportunities
that some universities may offer for advancing publicly beneficial drug
development goals, this Article does not suggest that all universities should be
experimenting with moving downstream into product development. Rather, it
concludes that the relatively small number of universities that have strong
capabilities in drug discovery and development may have comparative
advantages in moving further downstream in drug development, and that the
legal framework should respond directly to both the challenges and the
opportunities that this changed university role might provide.
I. THE PRODUCTIVITY CRISIS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Consider two numbers: 800,000 and 21. The first is the number of
medical papers that were published in 2008. The second is the
number of new drugs that were approved by the Food and Drug
22
Administration [in 2010].
The past 60 years have seen huge advances in many of the scientific,
technological and managerial factors that should tend to raise the

22 David Bornstein, Helping New Drugs out of Research’s ‘Valley of Death,’ N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR
(May 2, 2011, 9:15 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/helping-new-drugs-out-ofacademias-valley-of-death.
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efficiency of commercial drug research and development (R&D). Yet
the number of new drugs approved per billion US dollars spent on
R&D has halved roughly every 9 years since 1950, falling around 8023
fold in inflation-adjusted terms.

Few question the need for change in the pharmaceutical industry. What this
change should look like, however, is a matter of debate. To understand the
challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry and the role of U.S. research
universities in helping to address these challenges, it is helpful to have some
understanding of the traditional drug discovery and development process and
the legal framework that helped to shape it.
A. The Traditional Approach to Drug Development
Creating a new drug is a complicated, iterative process, but at a basic and
highly simplified level it can be understood as follows: Drug discovery
typically begins with the identification of a drug target, such as a protein, that
research has shown to play a role in disease.24 Basic research into the
underlying mechanisms of disease and the nature of disease pathways
contributes to the discovery of new drug targets.25 After identifying a
promising drug target, investigators search for or create drug candidates that
can block or activate that target.26 Processes of drug discovery increasingly
employ new technologies, such as high-throughput screening, to identify drug
candidates.27 Once promising drug candidates have been identified, next steps
include synthesis, characterization, screening, and testing of the candidate to
evaluate its therapeutic effectiveness.28 The hoped-for result is a drug
candidate that shows promise in addressing an unmet medical need. Drug
development starts with the drug candidate and involves the steps required to
seek transformation of the candidate into an approved drug. This involves

23 Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the Decline in Pharmaceutical R&D Efficiency, 11 NATURE REVS.
DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 191 (2012).
24 For an accessible description and characterization of the drug development and discovery process, see
Jens Eckstein, Drug Discovery Tutorial, ALZHEIMER RES. F., http://www.alzforum.org/drg/tut/ISOATutorial.
pdf (last visited May 8, 2013).
25 Id. at 3.
26 Id. at 6.
27 See id. at 7. An increasingly important way of finding promising drug candidates is to investigate how
the target interacts with randomly chosen compounds, typically done through high-throughput screening
(HTS) facilities with the use of compound libraries. See id. Hits, or compounds that show binding capacity to
the target, become the subject of further study and refinement. Id. at 7–8, 11.
28 See Making a Drug, BIG PICTURE, Jan. 2008, at 4, 4, available at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/
groups/corporatesite/@msh_publishing_group/documents/web_document/wtx042416.pdf.
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preclinical testing, primarily in microorganisms and animal models, followed
by clinical testing in humans to determine the safety and efficacy of the
proposed drug, and finally regulatory approval.29
In the traditional model of drug discovery, private sector organizations rely
on universities and publicly funded researchers, along with their own internal
research efforts, to generate basic knowledge about disease mechanisms and to
identify leads for new drug candidates. Biotechnology and pharmaceutical
companies use this publicly funded knowledge to isolate promising drug
candidates for further development work.30 The traditional process of drug
development has been a closed one, relying not just on legal mechanisms such
as patents and data exclusivity, but also on organizational strategies such as
internalizing core development activities to limit information sharing.31
Pharmaceutical companies look for exclusive intellectual property rights to
promising drug candidates, and then engage in a closed, resource-intensive
process of screening, testing, refining, and engaging in clinical trials for those
drug candidates that have the potential to become approved drugs with
significant economic markets.32 Universities have come to play a greater role
in early phases of drug discovery over the past several decades because the
lines between research and early-stage development have blurred and
discovery tools, such as high-throughput screening, have become more
accessible to academic researchers.33 Yet the private sector has continued to
dominate later phases of drug development.34 Moreover, much of this

29 See, e.g., About Drug Discovery and Development, PPD, http://www.ppdi.com/About/About-DrugDiscovery-and-Development.aspx (last visited May 8, 2013); Drug Development and Review Definitions, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedand
Approved/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/ucm176522.htm (last updated Feb.
22, 2010). There is an additional complicated transition from regulatory approval to effective use by the
patient with the unmet medical need. This second part of the translational medicine process is also an area in
which universities can play an important role.
30 See, e.g., B. Michael Silber, Commentary, Driving Drug Discovery: The Fundamental Role of
Academic Labs, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., May 5, 2010, at 1, 1.
31 See, e.g., Cressey, supra note 11, at 17.
32 See, e.g., KI Kaitin, Deconstructing the Drug Development Process: The New Face of Innovation, 87
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 356 (2010).
33 Silber, supra note 30, at 1, 3 (discussing the importance of academic labs in the development of
innovative new medicines, particularly through discoveries arising from basic research).
34 See, e.g., Cockburn, supra note 4 (describing changing industry structure but persistence of private
sector in controlling downstream development).

VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1

750

6/3/2013 10:13 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:741

development activity has been concentrated inside of a relatively small group
of very large pharmaceutical companies.35
This distribution of responsibilities between publicly funded research
institutions and the private sector is largely a function of the U.S. legal and
regulatory framework. Public funds are channeled through the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) and other federal and state funding agencies, such as
the National Science Foundation (NSF), to support scientific research.36 These
public funds support research on the underlying mechanisms of disease and
potential targets for therapies, as well as discoveries in other areas with
potential application to drug discovery and development.37 This research is
conducted mainly at universities, government laboratories, and other research
institutions.38 Large pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology companies
pick up the resulting discoveries through licensing of underlying intellectual
property rights.39 These commercial entities engage in extensive drug

35 For an example of an overview of pharmaceutical industry output based on different measures of
concentration, see Joseph A. DiMasi, New Drug Innovation and Pharmaceutical Industry Structure: Trends in
the Output of Pharmaceutical Firms, 34 DRUG INFO. J. 1169 (2000). See also LARRY DAVIDSON & GENNADIY
GREBLOV, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005) (examining major players in
the pharmaceutical industry and industry trends).
36 See SARGENT, supra note 7; see also About NIH, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/
(last updated Feb. 6, 2013) (“NIH is the largest source of funding for medical research in the world . . . .”).
37 The mission of the NIH, for example, is to “seek fundamental knowledge about the nature and
behavior of living systems and the application of that knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce
the burdens of illness and disability.” Mission, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/mission.htm
(last updated Mar. 3, 2011). It has grown into the single largest funder of biomedical research in the world.
About NIH, supra note 36.
38 See, e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 15. This approach reflects a post-World War II vision of U.S.
innovation in which public funding supports basic research at universities and other research institutions,
which is later picked up and commercialized by the private sector. Universities are seen as the engines of
innovation, generating public goods that serve as the inputs for private goods produced by the private sector.
Id. at 1.
39 See, e.g., Gary P. Pisano, The Governance of Innovation: Vertical Integration and Collaborative
Arrangements in the Biotechnology Industry, 20 RES. POL’Y 237 (1991) (examining the evolution of the
organizational structure of the biotechnology industry, highlighting governance choices as responding to the
special nature and challenges of the technology, and noting the evolution of the biotechnology industry as a
specialized R&D supply market). While a variety of other players have emerged in the pharmaceutical market
alongside pharmaceutical companies, including biotechnology companies that venture downstream into drug
development and contract research organizations that perform various phases of the development process, the
characteristics of the process of concern here have remained largely unchanged. Drug development is still
largely a proprietary process requiring significant scale economies, although outsourcing is increasing. See,
e.g., Cockburn, supra note 4, at 13; David Maris, What’s Really Driving the Pharma M&A Frenzy, FORBES
(Apr. 27, 2012, 11:42 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmaris/2012/04/27/pharma-feeding-frenzy/
(discussing trend of consolidation in the pharmaceutical sector).
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development efforts in the hope of finding and marketing a blockbuster drug.40
They incur the significant cost of pushing promising drug candidates through
the rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive process of clinical testing
required by the Food and Drug Administration in order to obtain approval for
new drugs.41
Two key pieces of legislation, the Bayh–Dole Act and the Stevenson–
Wydler Technology Innovation Act, were enacted in 1980 to facilitate the
transfer of federally funded inventions from university and government labs to
the private sector for applied research and development.42 The Bayh–Dole Act,
an amendment to the U.S. Patent Act, allows universities and other entities to
elect title to inventions developed at least in part through the use of federal
funds. If they elect title to the intellectual property rights in these inventions,
these entities are then obligated to seek patent protection and engage in efforts
to ensure the commercialization of the invention.43 The Stevenson–Wydler
Technology Innovation Act and the subsequent Federal Technology Transfer
Act of 1986 granted new authority to federal laboratories, such as the NIH
Intramural Research Program, to engage in technology transfer and partner
with industry.44 These Acts were designed with the key goal of facilitating the
movement of ideas into the marketplace.45 They leave the post-discovery piece
of the innovation process largely to the private market. The Bayh–Dole Act in
particular pays little attention to the innovation-related activities of the

40

See Cressey, supra note 11, at 17.
For a description of the FDA drug approval process, see Development & Approval Process (Drugs),
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/default.htm (last updated
Oct. 15, 2012); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs,
22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003). For critiques of the FDA process and its impact on drug costs, see for
example, Gary S. Becker, Get the FDA Out of the Way, and Drug Prices Will Drop, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 15, 2002), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2002-09-15/get-the-fda-out-of-theway-and-drug-prices-will-drop; and Avik Roy, How the FDA Stifles New Cures, Part I: The Rising Cost of
Clinical Trials, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/04/24/how-the-fdastifles-new-cures-part-i-the-rising-cost-of-clinical-trials/, which reviewed a Manhattan report on FDA costs.
42 Stevenson–Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3714 (2006)); Bayh–Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6, 94 Stat. 3015, 3018–
27 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)). The Stevenson–Wydler Act is codified in
the U.S. Code under the heading “Technology Innovation.”
43 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(3) (2006) (amended 2011).
44 For a summary of these major pieces of technology transfer legislation, see Howard Bremer, U.S.
Laws Affecting the Transfer of Intellectual Property, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH
AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 265, 266 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds.,
2007).
45 David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Patents and Patent Policy Debates in the USA,
1925–1980, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 781, 796 (2001).
41
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university beyond its initial disclosure, patenting, and minimal reporting
requirements. While the Act includes march-in rights as a mechanism for
ensuring that publicly funded inventions are not shelved, these march-in rights
are poorly specified and have never been used.46
Technology transfer legislation, along with significant public funds
directed at research but not at development activities, has reinforced the
existing distribution of drug discovery and development activities between
research institutions and the private sector. The growth of technology transfer
offices across most, if not all, of the major U.S. research universities has
further entrenched this model of university technology transfer.47 While
additional federal programs have since been developed to support the private
sector in moving early-stage technologies out of universities, these programs
remain small in comparison to the amount of public funding directed at basic
research.48 Moreover, where public funds are targeted at development
activities, they are directed primarily at commercial entities rather than at
universities.49
This model of proprietary drug development fueled by public biomedical
research has dominated the biomedical industry for decades.50 The apparent
success of this model has served as the poster child for government policies
supporting public funding of biomedical research and strong, privately owned
patent rights on the fruits of this research.51 Against this background, a small
group of large pharmaceutical companies has been able to retain its dominance
in the pharmaceutical industry and has limited changes in downstream
processes of drug development and distribution.52 The pharmaceutical industry
46

See 35 U.S.C. § 203 (describing the march-in rights).
See DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY–INDUSTRY
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH–DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 144–47 (2004);
Bhaven N. Sampat & Richard R. Nelson, The Evolution of University Patenting and Licensing Procedures: An
Empirical Study of Institutional Change, in 19 THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 135,
150–56 (Paul Ingram & Brian S. Silverman eds., 2002).
48 See Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR)
Programs, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH OFF. EXTRAMURAL RES., http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/sbirsttr_
programs.htm (last updated Mar. 6, 2013).
49 See id. Both the SBIR and STTR programs involve seed funding to private companies—in the case of
STTR, private companies working in partnership with research institutions. See id.
50 See, e.g., Making a Drug, supra note 28, at 4.
51 Indeed, even Michele Boldrin and David Levine, in their arguments for abolishing the patent system,
have suggested that patents may play a useful role in the pharmaceutical industry. MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID
K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008).
52 See DiMasi, supra note 35; see also DAVIDSON & GREBLOV, supra note 35 (examining major players
in the pharmaceutical industry and industry trends).
47
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is a highly regulated industry, and lack of change in the regulatory
infrastructure may also have contributed to the lack of innovation in the
process of making drugs. Despite the many advances that have taken place in
the science and technology of drug discovery, the subsequent process of drug
development has changed relatively little.53 What has changed dramatically is
the cost and risk of moving from an early-stage idea to a commercial drug
candidate.54
B. The Need for Change
Diverse commentators have expressed serious concerns about the
sustainability of the current translational process. However, as can
sometimes happen in the midst of crisis, this uncertainty is inspiring
creative ideas among the various stakeholders and fueling quests for
55
ground-breaking translational models.
– Francis Collins, Director of the NIH

Moving from early stages of the discovery process to late stages of
development has become more and more expensive. The cost of developing a
new drug is estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars, commonly
believed to be over $800 million based on reported industry data, with some
estimates at over $1 billion.56 Much of the expense arises in later stages of drug
development, particularly during the preclinical studies and clinical trials

53 See Collins, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing the need for innovation in the process of drug development,
e.g., in how clinical trials are conducted).
54 See Cockburn, supra note 1, at 2 (evaluating changes in productivity in the pharmaceutical industry).
55 Collins, supra note 1, at 2.
56 See, e.g., JORGE MESTRE-FERRANDIZ ET AL., OFFICE OF HEALTH ECON., THE R&D COST OF A NEW
MEDICINE, at v (2012); Roger Collier, Drug Development Cost Estimates Hard to Swallow, 180 CMAJ 279,
279 (2009) (discussing Tufts Center of Drug Development figures of cost of drug discovery and development);
DiMasi et al., supra note 41 (attempting to measure the total capitalized costs of sixty-eight randomly selected
new drugs); John Carroll, Economists Cite Soaring Costs Behind Average $1.9B Price Tag on Drug R&D,
FIERCEBIOTECH (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/story/economists-cite-soaring-costs-behindaverage-19b-price-tag-drug-rd/2012-12-03. But see Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing
the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34, 46–47 (2011) (critiquing current reports on
R&D costs for new drugs and seeking to show how much lower actual drug development costs may be and
suggesting the true cost may be closer to $43.4 million); James Love, Evidence Regarding Research and
Development Investments in Innovative and Non-Innovative Medicines 6–7 (Sept. 23, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/rnd/evidenceregardingrnd.pdf; Timothy Noah, The
Make-Believe Billion, SLATE (Mar. 3, 2011, 9:19 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_customer/
2011/03/the_makebelieve_billion.html (discussing studies critiquing high estimates of drug discovery and
development costs).
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needed to obtain regulatory approval of a new drug.57 Fewer than one in ten
medical therapies that move into human clinical trials succeed.58 An estimated
82% of drugs fail phase II clinical trials,59 only an estimated 50% of phase III
studies are successful, and only about 60% of drugs submitted to the FDA get
approved.60 The high failure rate at these late stages of development produces
massive financial losses for pharmaceutical companies engaged in drug
development.61 Moreover, many of the drugs that end up failing in late-stage
clinical trials fail due to lack of efficacy or safety based on issues that should
have been discoverable long before phase III clinical testing.62 The high cost
and risk of failure, along with average timelines from target discovery to new
drug approval averaging thirteen years, deters the private sector from
supporting many promising drug development projects. Those projects
involving really new, and therefore risky, approaches to the treatment of
disease are especially hard to finance.63
The huge cost and time required to get a new molecular entity approved as
a drug, coupled with the high number of late-stage failures and the increasing
regulatory demand for more tailored therapeutics, has made drug development
less profitable for pharmaceutical companies. These realities, combined with
patent expirations of blockbuster drugs and thinning drug pipelines, have
produced a cumulative loss of $626 billion in the market capitalization of the

57

See, e.g., Paul et al., supra note 5, at 206 fig.2; F.M. Scherer, R&D Costs and Productivity in
Biopharmaceuticals (Harvard Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Faculty Research Working Paper No. 11-046, 2011). To
obtain regulatory approval for a new drug in the United States, clinical testing is required to show safety and
efficacy of the new drug. The process of regulatory approval by the FDA, the agency charged with approving
new drugs, involves Phase 0, which involves testing the properties of the drug in a small number of individuals
to study its properties, Phase I, which involves testing the drug in small numbers of people for safety, Phase II,
which involves larger clinical trials to study efficacy and safety, and Phase III trials, which evaluate efficacy.
Some drugs also go through Phase IV, post-approval studies. For a simple description of these phases, see
Clinical Trials: What You Need to Know, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/cid/
documents/webcontent/003006-pdf.pdf (last updated Sept. 21, 2012); FDA’s Drug Review Process:
Continued, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm289601.
htm (last updated Mar. 13, 2012).
58 Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES, Mar. 12, 2012, at 38.
59 John Arrowsmith, Phase II Failures: 2008–2010, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 328, 328
(2011).
60 See Bernard Munos, In Defense of the FDA, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2012, 8:04 AM), www.forbes.com/
sites/bernardmunos/2012/12/19/in-defense-of-fda/.
61 See Silber, supra note 30, at 1 (discussing financial impact of failed drugs).
62 See Munos, supra note 60 (reporting that the combined failure rate for phase III clinical trials and
submission to the FDA is estimated to be 70%, and approximately “87% of these failures are due to lack of
efficacy (66%) or safety (21%)”).
63 See Collins, supra note 1, at 1.
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pharmaceutical industry from 2001 to 2009 with further substantial losses
expected ahead.64 Between 2012 and 2015, for example, patents on drugs
accounting for more than $250 billion in annual sales will expire, and many of
the largest pharmaceutical companies have already seen more than $60 billion
in lost annual sales due to competition from generics.65
Barriers to the flow of knowledge and technology also help to explain why
major advances in knowledge about the underlying mechanisms of disease,
along with breakthroughs in technologies for molecular modeling, drug
screening, and drug synthesis, have not produced corresponding breakthroughs
in the treatment of disease.66 Early-stage discoveries may be difficult to
translate into downstream applications for a variety of reasons. Discoveries
may be difficult to transfer across organizational boundaries due to both legal
and cultural differences between university and industry, particularly where the
transfer of tacit knowledge held by academic scientists is also needed to make
sense of and implement early-stage discoveries.67 In addition, discoveries may
be difficult to attach to a particular drug development project because they
illuminate general disease mechanisms rather than specific drug candidates,
requiring translational work that is a combination of basic and applied research
to narrow down promising next steps for developing a particular drug. As
described by Francis Collins, the Director of the NIH:
64

Kaitin, supra note 32, at 359.
See, e.g., Jack DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expirations and the “Patent Cliff,” U.S.
PHARMACIST, June 2012, at 12, 20.
66 See Bornstein, supra note 22. As noted by David Bornstein:
65

Consider two numbers: 800,000 and 21.
The first is the number of medical research papers that were published in 2008. The
second is the number of new drugs that were approved by the Food and Drug Administration
last year.
That’s an ocean of research producing treatments by the drop. Indeed, in recent decades,
one of the most sobering realities in the field of biomedical research has been the fact that,
despite significant increases in funding—as well as extraordinary advances in things like
genomics, computerized molecular modeling, and drug screening and synthesization—the
number of new treatments for illnesses that make it to market each year has flatlined at
historically low levels.
Id.
67 See, e.g., Ajay Agrawal, University-to-Industry Knowledge Transfer: Literature Review and
Unanswered Questions, 3 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 285, 291–96 (2001); Lynne G. Zucker et al., Commercializing
Knowledge: University Science, Knowledge Capture, and Firm Performance in Biotechnology, 48 MGMT. SCI.
138, 138–43, 149–51 (2002). See generally Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009, 1012, 1014–16 (2008) (discussing tacit knowledge); Peter Lee, Patent Law and
the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010); Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents,
Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503 (2012).
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Scientific advances have moved us from an era in which most drug
development was based on a short list of a few hundred targets with
great depth of understanding to an era in which molecular
technologies provide thousands of new potential drug targets but
limited information about their mechanisms and potential
68
“druggability.”

Advances in science may generate too many promising clinical avenues. They
may challenge the existing medical taxonomy in ways that fit poorly with
traditional disease-specific development paths.69 Changes in the nature of the
scientific knowledge reinforce the need for a changed model of drug discovery
and development that includes a greater integration of research institutions into
development processes.
Integrating research and development might improve upstream knowledge
flows, but difficulties in managing and sharing information efficiently also
plague downstream development efforts. A lack of data transparency at all
stages of the drug development process contributes to a duplication of drug
development efforts and wasted resources as firms pursue drug candidates that
end in failure.70 The challenge of moving a promising discovery from earlystage discovery to phase II clinical studies is often referred to with dread by
stakeholders in drug discovery and development as moving across the “[v]alley
of [d]eath.”71 Common themes emerging from the growing literature on
translational research and technology transfer in biomedicine include
inadequate private investment in drug development due to cost, duration, and
risk of the development process; breakdowns in the flow of information
between different entities in the innovation process; and underinvestment in

68

Collins, supra note 1, at 1–2.
Id. In discussing the challenges confronting translational research, Francis Collins has suggested that
new research approaches “have revealed that diseases once considered quite distinct can share similar
molecular pathways . . . suggest[ing] that the entire framework of medical taxonomy requires rethinking and
that therapeutics of the future likely will be designed with cellular networks in mind, rather than being limited
by historical designations of disease category.” Id. at 2.
70 See, e.g., Michel Goldman et al., Public–Private Partnerships as Driving Forces in the Quest for
Innovative Medicines, CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL MED. 2 (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.clintransmed.com/
content/pdf/2001-1326-2-2.pdf (discussing the importance of tackling knowledge fragmentation through
public–private collaborations that foster areas of data sharing).
71 See, e.g., EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., THE NEW ROLE OF ACADEMIA IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT
7, 11 (2010), available at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/town_hall_white_paper_12-10.pdf
(discussing the valley of death and efforts to address it in a report based on town hall meetings with experts in
the field); see also Rai et al., supra note 10, at 3–4, 8–9 (pointing out that big pharmaceutical companies tend
to focus on a few hundred validated targets because they are safe and thus primarily produce “me-too” drugs
instead of novel therapies).
69
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and too little sharing of information that has a net public benefit due to limits
on the private appropriation of value.
But cost, duration, risk, and barriers to the flow of information and
knowledge are not the only problems facing the pharmaceutical industry. The
dominance of the blockbuster-drug business model in the pharmaceutical
industry has contributed to a growing disconnect between the therapeutic areas
of concentrated industry focus and the types of treatments that are needed to
address unmet medical needs.72 The prevalence of clusters of drugs that have
only minor differences from an existing drug, known as “me-too” drugs, and
the prevalence of expensive technologies with limited proven clinical
effectiveness have prompted some health law scholars and advocates to
propose interventions designed to tie the rewards of innovation more closely to
health outcomes.73
That this segmented, proprietary, blockbuster model of drug development
is no longer either desirable or sustainable is increasingly well recognized and
well documented.74 “[T]he triple frustrations of long timelines, steep costs, and
high failure rates bedevil the translational pathway” from dramatic advances in
biomedical science to new drugs.75 Stakeholders are coming to realize that a
more radical change is needed. It is time to reengineer the drug development
process.76 These efforts must include increased interaction between different
stages of discovery and development in support of a “fail earlier and more
often and tell people about it” model of drug development involving greater
collaboration, cooperation, and data sharing. Both government and research-

72 See, e.g., Carl Nathan, Commentary, Aligning Pharmaceutical Innovation with Medical Need, 13
NATURE MED. 304 (2007).
73 See, e.g., THOMAS POGGE, AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV. DEV. POLICY CTR., THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MORE
JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY IN GLOBAL HEALTH (2011).
74 See, e.g., Alex Kandybin & Vessela Genova, Big Pharma’s Uncertain Future, STRATEGY & BUS.,
Spring 2012, at 1, 3–4; see also Ben Hirschler, Data Shows Declining Productivity in Drug R&D, REUTERS,
June 27, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/27/us-pharmaceuticals-rd-idUSTRE65
Q3IM20100627 (“The 2010 Pharmaceutical R&D Factbook, compiled by CMR International . . . painted a
gloomy picture of the global pharmaceuticals sector. New drugs launched within the last five years accounted
for less than 7 percent of industry sales in 2009, down from 8 percent in 2008 . . . .”).
75 Collins, supra note 1, at 1.
76 See Arti K. Rai, “Open and Collaborative” Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 131 (Robert W.
Hahn ed., 2005); Jeff Cohen et al., Strategic Alternatives in the Pharmaceutical Industry, KELLOGG SCH.
MGMT., http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/biotech/faculty/articles/strategic_alternatives.pdf (last visited
May 6, 2013).
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based nonprofit organizations will play an important role in facilitating these
efforts. As noted by the Director of the NIH:
[M]any of the most crucial challenges confronting translational
science today are precompetitive ones. The development of
systematic approaches for target validation, the reengineering of ratelimiting and failure-prone steps in the therapeutic development
process, and the urgent need to increase the critical mass of welltrained individuals to drive innovations are among the various
translational challenges that are ill-suited for solutions derived solely
77
from the private sector.

C. Public and Private Sector Responses Impacting University Roles
The question for both public and private stakeholders in the pharmaceutical
industry has thus become not whether but how to reconfigure the organization
of pharmaceutical innovation. But despite the recognized need for change, new
models of cost, risk, and information sharing have been slow to emerge.
Entrenched organizational interests in the status quo often limit the kinds of
shifts in development efforts between different stages of the innovation process
that are needed to respond to the knowledge produced. This is especially true
when the knowledge indicates that existing projects should be abandoned.
Moreover, private sector competitors find it hard to open their labs and
compound libraries to their competitors. Collective action problems among
pharmaceutical firms may discourage the kind of transparency and information
sharing needed to sustain new models of interactive discovery and
development. Antitrust concerns may also discourage private sector
competitors from collaborations amongst themselves.78 Barriers to private
sector restructuring combined with recognition of the collaborative capabilities
that already exist in research universities explain why both the public and the
private sectors are looking to universities to play an expanded role in drug
development.79

77

Collins, supra note 1, at 2.
See, e.g., Jason Clay, Precompetitive Behaviour—Defining the Boundaries, GUARDIAN (June 2, 2011,
6:46 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/precompetitive-behaviour-defining-boundaries
(discussing European Commission antitrust ruling that raises important questions about balance between
precompetitive behavior and collusion). For an example of industry navigation of the antitrust rules, see for
example, Antitrust Policy and Guidelines, BIOMARKERS CONSORTIUM, http://www.biomarkersconsortium.org/
pdf/Antitrust_Policy.pdf (last modified Mar. 1, 2011).
79 See, e.g., Cressey, supra note 11 (discussing emerging collaborative models of drug discovery and
development involving greater university role).
78
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Public sector views about what universities should be doing in the area of
pharmaceutical innovation are by no means uniform, however.80 Congressional
responses to the perceived pharmaceutical productivity crisis and the valley of
death have fallen largely into two silos. One response has been to question the
amount of federal money currently being spent on biomedical research, with
the suggestion that the rate of return is too low and the federal funding for this
research should be cut.81 In other words, solve the “valley of death problem”
by reducing the money spent on biomedical research.82 The second response
has been to seek more support for translational science—the science of
transforming knowledge about underlying mechanisms of disease into novel
and effective medical therapies—as a way of bridging the gap between new
ideas and economic returns.83 This approach was reflected in the Obama
Administration’s 2011 Strategy for American Innovation, which highlighted
the goal of commercializing research performed at U.S. research universities.84

80 See, e.g., Steve Usdin, Lost in Translation, BIOCENTURY, Feb. 14, 2011, at A1 (describing the many
competing views about federal spending on R&D).
81 The search for alternative forms of governance that will improve the system of biomedical innovation
is driven in part by the beliefs of some members of Congress that the existing system of university technology
transfer is broken, beliefs fueled by proponents of a more free-market, free-agency approach to technology
transfer. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON JOBS & COMPETITIVENESS, TAKING ACTION, BUILDING CONFIDENCE:
FIVE COMMON-SENSE INITIATIVES TO BOOST JOBS AND COMPETITIVENESS 21–22 (2011), available at
http://files.jobs-council.com/jobscouncil/files/2011/10/JobsCouncil_InterimReport_Oct11.pdf
(describing
strategies for the private sector to foster entrepreneurship); Matt Erskine, NACIE Promotes Innovative Lab-toMarket Strategies to Spur Economic Growth, U.S. DEPARTMENT COM. (Mar. 13, 2012, 6:30 PM),
http://www.commerce.gov/blog/2012/03/13/nacie-promotes-innovative-lab-market-strategies-spur-economicgrowth (describing the National Advisory Council on Innovation and Entrepreneurship’s lab-to-market
strategies). Of even more concern, perceived failures to translate public investments in biomedical science into
tangible economic gains has fuelled pressures within Congress to alter, and even dramatically reduce, public
spending on biomedical research even as costs for conducting biomedical research increase.
82 See, e.g., SARGENT, supra note 7; Congress Shifting into FY2013 Spending Debate, AM. ASS’N FOR
CANCER RES. (Jan. 2012), http://www.aacr.org/home/public--media/science-policy--government-affairs/aacrcancer-policy-monitor/aacr-cancer-policy-monitor---january-2012/congress-shifting-into-fy2013-spendingdebate.aspx (discussing partisan stalemate that impacts spending on basic science); Jeffrey Mervis, Making the
Case for Science: Representative Randy Hultgren Sees Room for Improvement in Federal Role, SCI. INSIDER
(Nov. 13, 2012, 1:25 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2012/11/making-the-case-for-sciencerepr.html (arguing against what some have called “luxury science” and advocating for the critical need to
support science spending in Congress); see also T Randolph Beard et al., A Valley of Death in the Innovation
Sequence: An Economic Investigation, 18 RES. EVALUATION 343 (2009) (suggesting that spending decisions
that do not reflect later-stage investment patterns contribute to the valley of death).
83 See Collins, supra note 1, at 3–5.
84 See, e.g., Memorandum from Ass’n of Am. Univs. et al. to the Office of the Chief Economist, U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce (Apr. 1, 2011), available at www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=12038
(discussing models and strategies for university involvement in translational research and commercialization,
including proof-of-concept centers, and highlighting the university position that the ownership provisions
provided for under the Bayh–Dole Act should be maintained).
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The result of these sometimes conflicting policy responses has been a moderate
decline in the inflation-adjusted budget of the largest funder of biomedical
research, the NIH, with looming threats of much larger cuts and a shift of
existing NIH efforts and funding toward translational research projects, many
of them involving universities.85
The NIH has taken the lead among public policy makers in trying to
reengineer the drug development process, and its views and actions have had a
significant impact on the U.S. research university community. U.S. research
universities with significant biomedical research capabilities watch NIH policy
changes closely, since a substantial part of their research funding comes from
the NIH and since their reputation is determined in part by the amount of NIH
and NSF funds attracted by university investigators.86 Expanding translational
science capacity—the facilities, skills, and other resources needed to promote
post-discovery efforts at pushing drug candidates through later-stage
discovery, preclinical testing, and clinical testing—forms the core of the NIH’s
reengineering strategy.87 In 2004 the NIH launched its Roadmap for Medical
Research, making collaboration in the production, sharing, and application of
knowledge its central theme.88 This roadmap was the precursor to the NIH
Common Fund, an institutional step toward creating translational science
capacity by supporting crosscutting, trans-NIH programs targeted at specific,
identified roadblocks in translational science.89 The newest manifestation of

85 See, e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 15; SARGENT, supra note 7; Usdin, supra note 80. As part of the
translational research efforts, there is also a push to increase the amount of work done by government agencies
themselves in the development of medical therapies. See, e.g., Cures Acceleration Network, NAT’L CENTER
FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/funding-and-notices/can/can.html (last
visited May 8, 2013).
86 See, e.g., The Top American Research Universities, CENTER FOR MEASURING U. PERFORMANCE,
http://mup.asu.edu/research.html (last visited May 8, 2013) (noting the important role of federal research
dollars in ranking); see also Joel Norris, The Crisis in Extramural Funding, ACADEME, Nov./Dec. 2011, at 28,
30–31 (suggesting “greater amounts of extramural funding appear to be associated with more prestige”);
ASS’N AM. U., http://www.aau.edu (last visited May 8, 2013) (outlining organization of leading research
universities where membership is by invitation and based largely on nature and amount of research funding).
87 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 1, at 1; see also Re-Engineering Translational Sciences, NAT’L CENTER
FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/reengineering.html
(last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
88 See About the NIH Common Fund, NIH COMMON FUND, http://commonfund.nih.gov/about.aspx (last
updated May 7, 2013). The roadmap was designed to “address roadblocks to research and to transform the way
biomedical research is conducted by overcoming specific hurdles or filling defined knowledge gaps.” Id.
89 See id. The Clinical and Translational Science Awards (CTSA) Consortium was initially created as a
roadmap program, and the Molecular Libraries and Imaging Program is a current common fund program.
These initiatives are designed to support and link a network of clinical and translational research centers, each
of which is involved in public–private collaborations targeted at different parts of the drug development
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these efforts at institutional reengineering is the National Center for Advancing
Translational Science (NCATS).90
NCATS was officially established in fiscal year 2012 with a budget of
$575 million, comprising programs and funds that were redirected from other
units at NIH.91 In 2013 it will have an estimated budget of $639 million, based
on FY 2013 budget requests.92 NCATS includes both program support for
institutions engaging in translational research and public facilities for pursuing
different parts of the drug development process.93 NCATS is now entering its
second year and is focusing primarily on developing preclinical and clinical
capabilities that can reduce the cost and risk of drug development for the
private sector.94 In some cases, the NIH provides translational research
capacity directly, through creating facilities, compound libraries, or other
resources that are open to the public.95 In other cases, the NIH programs seek
to build university capacity, either through funding university infrastructure or
through opportunities for university investigators.96 The intellectual property

process. See About the CTSA Consortium, CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. AWARDS,
https://www.ctsacentral.org/about-us/ctsa (last visited May 8, 2013); Molecular Libraries and Imaging, NIH
COMMON FUND, https://commonfund.nih.gov/molecularlibraries/ (last updated Mar. 18, 2013).
90 See NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/ (last visited May
7, 2013).
91 NCATS was created on December 23, 2011 by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, which
amended the Public Health Service (PHS) Act to include NCATS. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 479, 125 Stat. 786, 1086–88 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
The stated mission of NCATS is to “catalyze the generation of innovative methods and technologies that will
enhance the development, testing, and implementation of diagnostics and therapeutics across a wide range of
human diseases and conditions.” Department of Health and Human Services National Institutes of Health
Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Labor-HHS-Educ. Appropriations,
112th Cong. 8 (2012) (statement of Thomas R. Insel, Acting Director, National Center for Advancing
Translational Sciences).
92 See Budget, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/about/
budget/budget.html (last visited May 8, 2013).
93 See Research, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/
research/research.html (last visited May 8, 2013).
94 See id. It is organized into a Division of Clinical Innovation that supports later stages of translational
research, much of it done in academic medical centers, and a Division of Pre-Clinical Innovation with projects
aimed at bridging gaps in investment in early development phases for new drugs that address unmet medical
needs. The Division of Pre-Clinical Innovation includes the Therapeutics for Rare and Neglected Diseases
(TRND) program and the Bridging Interventional Development Gaps (BrIDGs) program to assist both
academic and private researchers and companies working on developing novel therapies for unmet medical
needs. Program Index, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/
about/program-index/program-index.html (last visited May 8, 2013).
95 For a fact sheet, including a description of programs, see NCATS Fact Sheet, NAT’L CENTER FOR
ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI. (Summer 2012), http://www.ncats.nih.gov/files/factsheet.pdf.
96 Id.
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structures supporting the different NCATS initiatives vary, but many of the
infrastructure-based programs, such as developing open-source research tools,
screening facilities, and compound libraries, seek to leave nongovernment
parties in control of any inventions arising from contributions that they make.97
These kinds of publicly funded and supported collaborations to develop drugs
are already raising important questions about the fit of the existing legal
structure governing federally funded research. The NIH is exploring special
approaches to contracting and intellectual property ownership in the context of
such programs in the hope of improving the governing structures for these
projects.98 Experiments such as the NIH pilot program on Discovering New
Therapeutic Uses for Existing Molecules include proposed collaboration
agreements designed to support project objectives, but these proposed
agreements also include provisions that may run afoul of university norms and
policies, such as broad development options to private sector developers.99
The main NIH translational research efforts to date, which extend well
beyond the domain of NCATS, are largely responses to the high costs, risks,
and other barriers that deter drug discovery and development work. NIH
responses have focused on providing public infrastructure for various aspects
of the drug discovery and development process, such as government-owned
screening facilities and compound libraries that are made publicly available,100
97 See, e.g., Preclinical Drug Development Services for the NIH Center for Translational Therapeutics
(NCTT), National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS), FED. BUS. OPPORTUNITIES (May 2,
2012), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=4c78cc3b9fd7d503ff94b9ff39c1
6812&_cview=0. The proposed IP strategy for the NCATS Preclinical Drug Development Services program
proposes to use the “Determination of Exceptional Circumstances” provided for under the Bayh–Dole Act to
allow assignment of ownership to the private-party contributor. Id.
98 For an NIH description of its Discovering New Therapeutic Use for Existing Molecules program and
its use of template agreements and specific approaches to collaboration and intellectual property ownership,
see Discovering New Therapeutic Uses for Existing Molecules, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING
TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/rescue-repurpose/therapeutic-uses/
therapeutic-uses.html (last visited May 8, 2013). For concerns about this approach and responses to the NIH
proposal for the preclinical programs, see for example, Letter from Anthony P. DeCrappeo, President, Council
on Governmental Relations, to Nat’l Insts. of Health (June 1, 2012) [hereinafter Letter from Anthony P.
DeCrappeo, June 1, 2012], available at www.cogr.edu/viewDoc.cfm?DocID=151925. See also Letter from
Anthony DeCrappeo, President, Council on Governmental Relations, to Kelli T. Broda, Contracts Specialist,
Office of Acquisitions (May 17, 2012), available at www.cogr.edu/viewDoc.cfm?DocID=151911 (expressing
concerns with NIH efforts to use the “exceptional circumstances” provision in Bayh–Dole to reshape IP
ownership rules for one of its programs).
99 See, e.g., Letter from Anthony P. DeCrappeo, June 1, 2012, supra note 98 (expressing concerns with
NIH dictating terms of contracts involved in the program that conflict with university policies).
100 See, e.g., Rescuing and Repurposing Drugs, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI.,
http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/rescue-repurpose/rescue-repurpose.html (last visited May 8,
2013). An example is the NCATS Drug Rescuing and Repurposing program that focuses on finding new uses
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and encouraging partnerships between academic and industry players oriented
around the movement from lab to market.101 Some of the newer NIH programs
have focused on incentivizing the creation of public–private and public–
academic–private collaborations, often referred to as PPPs, in targeted areas of
drug discovery and early-stage development. These efforts have mainly taken
the form of tailored grant opportunities and the creation of NIH-hosted drug
discovery centers and consortiums.102 These initiatives have been supported by
other key government players in the pharmaceutical industry, such as the
FDA.103
As noted above, universities are expected to play a central role in many of
these translational science initiatives since they have the scientific capabilities
and often the facilities and human capital needed to support earlier stage
translational work. Moreover, pharmaceutical companies may be more willing
to share their proprietary drug discovery and development resources with
universities than with private firms because universities are not direct
competitors. Universities provide a comparatively neutral site for what policy
makers are optimistically referring to as precompetitive collaborations
designed to share resources central to drug discovery efforts.104 Even if

for existing medicines. As part of this repurposing program, NCATS has created the NCATS Pharmaceutical
Collection, a publicly accessible database that includes 3,800 approved and investigational medicines available
for screening to find new uses. Id.
101 See, e.g., Erskine, supra note 81 (suggesting using lab-to-market strategies to promote economic
growth). These initiatives are designed to support cost and risk sharing, facilitate the transfer of knowledge
among participants in the innovation process, and subsidize the production of socially valuable information. Id.
102 See, e.g., Lili M. Portilla & Barbara Alving, Commentary, Reaping the Benefits of Biomedical
Research: Partnerships Required, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., June 9, 2010, at 1 (noting the importance of
academic collaboration among industry, academia, and government and the role of NIH in increasing the
efficiency of the translational process through support of various partnerships).
103 The FDA, another key government player in regulating the introduction of new drugs, outlined its own
views in response to the problems experienced by the biomedical industry with the introduction of the Critical
Path Initiative. The initiative was launched in March 2004, with the release of FDA’s landmark report
Innovation/Stagnation: Challenge and Opportunity on the Critical Path to New Medical Products. See FDA’s
Critical Path Initiative, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/
CriticalPathInitiative/ucm076689.htm (last updated Dec. 28, 2012). This initiative was launched with the
release of a report that diagnosed reasons for the translational valley of death and highlighted the need for
collective action to modernize scientific and technical tools and harness information technology to help
evaluate and predict the effectiveness and feasibility of medical products. The report “called for a national
effort to identify specific activities all along the critical path of medical product development and use, which,
if undertaken, would help transform the critical path sciences.” Id. By encouraging collaborations between
public and private players throughout the drug discovery and development process, both the FDA and NIH
hope to increase the output of effective new medical therapies.
104 See, e.g., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., DIFFUSION AND USE OF GENOMIC INNOVATIONS IN
HEALTH AND MEDICINE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY (2008); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ESTABLISHING
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universities take on a bigger role in downstream drug development, they are
likely to do so in partnership with pharmaceutical companies rather than in
competition with them.
The NIH roadmap and the initiatives that followed in its wake have
prompted experiments with university innovation capacity by universities with
established biomedical research facilities that are eager to protect and even
augment their NIH funding.105 The push for new ways of organizing drug
development processes that include expanded university roles comes not just
from government, however, but also from industry. After decades of pursuing
a highly centralized, proprietary approach to drug development,
pharmaceutical companies are restructuring their own research and
development activities in the face of unsustainable business models.106 They
are retrenching their drug discovery and development efforts and looking for
alternative ways to fill their drug pipelines. Recognizing that new models of
knowledge production and knowledge sharing are critical to solving the
productivity crisis in the biomedical industry, they are radically changing their
operations, moving away from centralized R&D, and instead relying on
outsourcing, joint ventures, and other ways to decentralize the drug discovery
and development process.107 One way of reducing costs is to share
development infrastructure wherever possible. This requires either
collaboration or outsourcing of various steps in the development process.108
Another way of reducing costs is to shift from a process in which there are
late-stage drug development failures to a system in which there are frequent
PRECOMPETITIVE COLLABORATIONS TO STIMULATE GENOMICS-DRIVEN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT: WORKSHOP
SUMMARY (2011).
105 All of the top U.S. research universities depend heavily on NIH and NSF funding to support their
biomedical research efforts. See, e.g., E. Ray Dorsey et al., Funding of US Biomedical Research, 2003–2008,
303 JAMA 137, 140 (2010) (“Federal sources remain the largest contributor to academic biomedical research
expenditures, accounting for 65% of expenditures, followed by institutional funds (18% of expenditures).”).
NIH and NSF funding also contributes heavily to the reputations of U.S. research universities, intensifying the
interest of the top ranked schools in retaining and attracting new federal funds. See, e.g., The Top American
Research Universities, supra note 86; see also Margaret E. Blume-Kohout et al., Federal Life Sciences
Funding and University R&D (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15146, 2009) (noting
empirical evidence suggests that success in attracting federal funds may be interpreted as signal of recipient
quality by nonfederal funders).
106 See Pammolli et al., supra note 5, at 428 (discussing an empirical examination of the decline in
pharmaceutical productivity and its determinants); Paul et al., supra note 5, at 203 (describing the productivity
crisis in pharmaceutical industry and examining the contributions of each step in R&D process to overall
productivity).
107 See, e.g., Cressey, supra note 11; see also Jackie Hunter, Is Open Innovation the Way Forward for Big
Pharma?, 9 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 87, 87 (2010).
108 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 107, at 87.
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early failures.109 This requires more interaction between different stages of the
discovery and development process, such as more experimentation with a
larger number of potential drug candidates at early stages of development.110
Pharmaceutical companies are pursing both strategies, resulting in
increased interaction between academic researchers and industry scientists and
a closer integration of the scientific aspects of drug discovery with the
commercial aspects of drug development.111 The increasingly dual nature of
many discoveries as both basic knowledge and commodities with commercial
application further intertwines research and development efforts. University–
industry partnering in different components of the drug discovery and
development process is therefore expanding in frequency and scope.112 While
strategies have varied among pharmaceutical companies, most if not all of the
larger ones have increased their proximity to and reliance on universities in
some way.113 Sometimes this has involved outsourcing discrete tasks in the
drug discovery and development process to universities or limited public–
academic–private collaborations around a discrete research project.114 In other
cases it has led to the creation of translational research centers involving

109 Paul et al., supra note 5, at 211; see also Failed Alzheimer’s Clinical Trial Data Made Public, 9
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 505, 505 (2010).
110 See, e.g., Eric Bonabeau et al., A More Rational Approach to New Product Development, HARV. BUS.
REV., Mar. 2008, at 96 (discussing problem with focusing disproportionately on late-stage development and
lack of adequate early-truth-seeking functions in drug development); Paul et al., supra note 5, at 211
(discussing quick-win, fast-fail models in contrast to traditional approaches to drug discovery and
development).
111 See, e.g., Todd B. Sherer, Money Without Collaboration Won’t Bring Cures, 19 NATURE MED. 127
(2013).
112 See, e.g., Bethan Hughes, Pharma Pursues Novel Models for Academic Collaboration, 7 NATURE
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 631 (2008) (discussing pharma’s search for new models of industry–academic
collaboration); see also Jerry Thursby & Marie Thursby, University–Industry Linkages in Nanotechnology and
Biotechnology: Evidence on Collaborative Patterns for New Methods of Inventing, 36 J. TECH. TRANSFER 605
(2011) (exploring emergence of new methods of collaborative inventing in nanotechnology and
biotechnology).
113 See Goldie Blumenstyk, Big Pharma Finds a Home on Campus, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), July
29, 2011, at A1 (examining the status and trends of pharmaceutical research in the United States in 2011,
particularly highlighting the shift in project spending from large industries to research universities); Heidi
Ledford, Drug Buddies, 474 NATURE 433 (2011) (discussing increasing ties between pharmaceutical industry
and academia in an effort to speed up drug development).
114 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER-PAUL MILNE & ASHLEY MALINS, TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV.,
ACADEMIC–INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIPS FOR BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT: ADVANCING
MEDICAL SCIENCE IN THE U.S. (2012), available at http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/tuftscsdd_academicindustry.pdf (describing various types of university–industry partnerships and documenting recent trends).
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varying degrees of joint research and development.115 New high-profile
pharma–academic partnerships have sprouted at many if not all of the leading
U.S. research universities.116 Pfizer, one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical
companies, has relocated many of its facilities next door to universities that
have well-developed drug discovery capabilities and is seeking to create
common campuses for collaborative work.117
In the search for new ways of reengineering the drug discovery and
development process, pharmaceutical companies have been more willing to
experiment with open-access models of academic collaboration.118 In some
cases, pharmaceutical companies have partnered with universities to make
preemptive investments in the public domain in efforts to preserve open access
to research inputs.119 Merck’s investment in the creation of the Merck Gene
Index, developed in partnership with Washington University in St. Louis,
provides an early example of this effort to preserve access to key inputs in drug
development.120 More recent efforts by both the private sector and the NIH

115 See, e.g., id.; see also Stewart Lyman, Pharma–Academic Alliances: What the Numbers Don’t Tell
You, XCONOMY (May 10, 2011), http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2011/05/10/pharma-academic-allianceswhat-the-numbers-dont-tell-you/?single_page=true (discussing changes in pharma–university partnerships, as
well as concerns with trends toward broader umbrella arrangements between pharma and academia).
116 See supra notes 113, 114; see also Martin Lehr, Pharma–Academic Partnerships & the Impact on
Venture Funds, OSAGE U. PARTNERS BLOG (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.blogoup.com/blog/2011/4/2/pharmaacademic-partnerships-the-impact-on-venture-funds.html (providing links to news stories covering recent
high-profile university–industry collaborations); Alan Scher Zagier, Drug Companies Partnering with Top
Schools, DRUG DISCOVERY & DEV. (Jan. 10, 2013, 2:54 PM), http://www.dddmag.com/news/2013/01/drugcompanies-partnering-top-schools.
117 See Pfizer: Creating a Biomedical Engine for Upstream Innovation, PARTNERING NEWS (Aug. 29,
2011),
http://ebdgroup.com/partneringnews/2011/08/pfizer-creating-a-biomedical-engine-for-upstreaminnovation/ (discussing Pfizer’s new Centers for Therapeutic Innovation, which include new common
campuses for collaborative work at highly ranked universities in San Francisco, Boston, San Diego, and New
York, funding, access to its databases, and other resources, and in return Pfizer’s first rights to license potential
products coming out of the networks it has supported); see also Lisa M. Jarvis, Pfizer’s Academic Experiment,
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 1, 2012, at 28, 28 (describing the Centers for Therapeutic Innovation
that Pfizer has established as an experiment in “building a different R&D ecosystem,” each center being a unit
in the company that focuses on developing drug candidates through collaborations with academic partners
through colocation of labs and broad collaboration arrangements).
118 See, e.g., B Munos, Can Open-Source Drug R&D Repower Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 87 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 534 (2010) (discussing proliferation of open-source R&D initiatives,
including many public–private partnerships, but noting some challenges with this approach).
119 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 188
(2004) (describing private efforts to protect the public domain).
120 See, e.g., Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., First Installment of Merck Gene Index Data Released to
Public Databases: Cooperative Effort Promises to Speed Scientific Understanding of the Human Genome (Feb.
10, 1995), available at http://www.bio.net/bionet/mm/bionews/1995-February/001794.html. Concerns about
patents on short snippets of the genetic code (SNPS), which were seen as important inputs in the development
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have focused on identifying and supporting areas of precompetitive
collaboration between academia and industry in which at least certain kinds of
knowledge can be developed and shared more freely.121 Examples include the
growth of compound libraries and high-throughput screening centers made
available to academics on open-access terms, with the goal of spurring drug
discovery and fueling pharmaceutical company product pipelines.122 Even
broader experiments with open access are taking place in areas where
proprietary commercial interests are low, such as the search for cures to
neglected diseases. The Tropical Disease Initiative123 and the open-access
Malaria Box124 are both examples of open-source drug development initiatives.
In some cases pharmaceutical companies have taken the lead in promoting
open-source initiatives. GlaxoSmithKline, for example, spearheaded formation
of a patent pool for neglected diseases and made one of its facilities available
to academic researchers interested in working on projects targeting neglected
disease areas.125 These open-source efforts remain focused on neglected
disease areas, however, and are reliant on philanthropic and government
support.

of diagnostics and drugs, prompted a pharmaceutical-company response led by Merck with the creation of the
Merck Gene Index. See Merges, supra note 119, at 187–88. This was a collaboration with Washington
University that involved the creation of a public database of gene sequences corresponding to expressed
human genes. See id. at 188.
121 See, e.g., About Us, BIOMARKERS CONSORTIUM, http://www.biomarkersconsortium.org/about.php (last
visited May 8, 2013); see also BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES (2012) (discussing the importance of public infrastructure in innovation processes); DISCOVERY
PARTNERSHIPS WITH ACADEMIA, www.dpac.gsk.com (last visited May 8, 2013); OPEN INNOVATION DRUG
DISCOVERY, https://openinnovation.lilly.com/dd/ (last visited May 8, 2013).
122 See, e.g., Anuradha Roy et al., Open Access High Throughput Drug Discovery in the Public Domain:
A Mount Everest in the Making, 11 CURRENT PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 764 (2010) (discussing
emergence of high-throughput screening centers in the public domain, including the large Molecular Libraries
Probe Centers Network Centers funded by the NIH roadmap initiative); Bayer Supports Innovative Drug
Discovery in Europe, PHARMANEWS.EU (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.pharmanews.eu/bayer/1213-bayersupports-innovative-drug-discovery-in-europe (reporting that Bayer initiated a pan-European consortium,
European Lead Factory, to enhance early drug discovery through creation of small molecule library collection,
with pharma contributions of at least 300,000 substances, supported by the Innovative Medicines Initiative,
which is a large global public–private partnership focusing on improving pharmaceutical innovation in Europe
through supporting academic–industry collaboration).
123 See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer?,
PLOS MED. 183 (Dec. 2004), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0010056.
124 See, e.g., Open Access Malaria Box, MEDS. FOR MALARIA VENTURE, http://www.mmv.org/malariabox
(last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the Malaria Box, which has 400 compounds with antimalarial activity
available to researchers in return for publishing and placing resulting data in the public domain).
125 See, e.g., Tres Cantos, GLAXOSMITHKLINE, http://www.gsk.com/partnerships/open-innovation/trescantos.html (last updated Nov. 28, 2012) (describing the company’s open lab at its Tres Cantos drug discovery
and development facility).
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While these various initiatives are promising ways of improving the
productivity of pharmaceutical innovation, more change is needed. The push
for new models of university involvement in drug development continues as
resources remain scarce and concerns for the future of pharmaceutical
innovation remain unabated.
II. EXPERIMENTING WITH UNIVERSITY INNOVATION CAPACITY
Universities are experiencing pressures from government and industry
partners to move beyond their traditional sphere of producing knowledge about
disease mechanisms and targets for new therapies and toward a more active
role in transforming their ideas into tangible economic goods.126 The
combination of increasing costs in supporting biomedical research and more
competitive and uncertain funding for such research has made this move
attractive for even those research institutions with little prior interest in moving
downstream into more applied development work. In response to these
pressures and corresponding funding, partnering, and research opportunities,
many leading U.S. research universities are actively experimenting with proofof-concept centers, translational research centers, and other ways of
broadening their involvement in drug discovery and development.127 Although
universities have collaborated with industry in drug discovery for decades, this
kind of experimentation with post-discovery drug development is a relatively
new phenomenon.128
While these experiments are relatively small in comparison with the scale
of more traditional academic biomedical research, they are paving the way for
broader organizational changes. Indeed, undertaking many of these
experiments has already required modifications to existing university
intellectual property policies and the development of guidelines, contracting
practices, and organizational structures to support multidisciplinary centers and
different kinds of public–academic–private collaboration. Developmentfocused initiatives prompt not only administrative changes, but also norm
126 See Anthony M. Boccanfuso, Commentary, Why University–Industry Partnerships Matter, SCI.
TRANSLATIONAL MED., Sept. 29, 2010, at 1, 1; Blumenstyk, supra note 113; Jennifer A. Henderson & John J.
Smith, Academia, Industry, and the Bayh–Dole Act: An Implied Duty to Commercialize 1 (Oct. 2002)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cimit.org/news/regulatory/coi_part3.pdf.
127 See Stephen Frye et al., US Academic Drug Discovery, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 409, 409
(2011); Joanne Kotz, Small (Molecule) Thinking in Academia, SCIBX, June 2, 2011, at 1, 1.
128 See, e.g., Frye et al., supra note 127, at 409 (analyzing small molecule drug discovery in academia and
documenting a large jump in activity); Kotz, supra note 127, at 1 (examining potential impact of academic
drug discovery and trends in academic involvement).
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changes operating among researchers both inside and outside of academic
medical centers, administrators, technology transfer professionals, and
governing bodies engaged in oversight of university activities.129 As research
universities already involved in drug discovery become more engaged in
development activities, beliefs among these constituencies concerning the
ways in which knowledge should be produced and applied, the role of the
university within the innovation process, and understandings of how academic
productivity should be evaluated and rewarded are shifting to accommodate
these activities. This raises concerns that universities may be shifting too
much, and without appropriate safeguards on the public knowledge function of
the university.
This Article suggests that there may be benefits to expanding the role of
universities with established drug discovery capabilities in the pharmaceutical
innovation process, provided that this expansion is managed carefully. These
benefits stem from certain advantages that universities may have over firms
and government labs in managing dual processes of producing knowledge and
producing products. Since this expansion of the university role into the
commercial domain of product development is not without significant costs
and risks, it should not be taken lightly.130 But where a university is already
successfully involved in drug discovery, pushing the involvement of the
university further into the development process may have advantages that are
in the public interest. This is particularly true for areas of drug discovery and
development that do not fit the blockbuster-drug profile and are therefore
neglected by the industry. Section A of this Part describes the potential
advantages of the university in managing drug discovery and development, and

129

See generally Jeannette A. Colyvas & Walter W. Powell, From Vulnerable to Venerated: The
Institutionalization of Academic Entrepreneurship in the Life Sciences, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 219, 220, 231, 255 (Martin Ruef & Michael Lounsbury eds., 2007) (studying the origins,
acceptance, and spread of academic entrepreneurship in the biomedical field at Stanford); Toby E. Stuart &
Waverly W. Ding, When Do Scientists Become Entrepreneurs? The Social Structural Antecedents of
Commercial Activity in the Academic Life Sciences, 112 AM. J. SOC. 97, 98 (2006) (examining the conditions
prompting university-employed life scientists to become entrepreneurs and finding evidence that the
orientation toward commercial science of individuals’ colleagues and coauthors, as well as a number of other
workplace attributes, significantly influences transition to for-profit science).
130 See, e.g., Zoghbi, supra note 4 (discussing concerns that the pressure to develop treatments and the
bias in NIH funding toward practical outcomes will crowd out support for basic research that is critical to the
future of biomedicine). “In recent years, however, the pressure to develop treatments at an ever more rapid
pace has attenuated enthusiasm for deciphering the language of life. . . . [T]oday, many highly qualified basic
scientists feel compelled to jump on the ‘translational medicine’ bandwagon.” Id. at 250.
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section B examines the directions that some universities are taking in
experimenting with expanded innovation capacity.
A. Comparative Advantages of Universities as Drug Developers
As discussed above, the innovation process for new drugs needs to include
greater interaction between discovery and development efforts; greater pooling
and sharing of knowledge, data, materials, and facilities; and collaborative
pathways for developing clusters of new drugs. This Article suggests that
universities have certain organizational characteristics that may give them a
comparative advantage over firms and government labs in managing the mixed
research and development activities required of modern pharmaceutical
innovation in ways that serve the public interest.131 These characteristics are
(1) the ability of universities, as specialized entities with a public knowledge
function, to sustain different systems of knowledge production with varying
levels of openness; (2) the disciplining influence of multiple stakeholders in
the knowledge production process on university decision making; and (3) the
flexibility, varying levels of autonomy, and alternative incentive schemes that
are available within the university’s relatively decentralized governance
structure.132
This combination of characteristics is beneficial for mixed processes of
scientific research and product development in at least two ways. First, the
organizational structure allows for the creation of semiautonomous projects, or
units, that can vary in terms of their level of openness and their end goals while
131 For a broader discussion of the organizational attributes employed in this paper, see Liza Vertinsky,
Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949. Nicholas Argyres and Julia Porter
Liebeskind have put forward a different organizational perspective. See Nicholas S. Argyres & Julia Porter
Liebeskind, Privatizing the Intellectual Commons: Universities and the Commercialization of Biotechnology,
35 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 427, 429 (1998) (“[T]he standardization of universities’ governance arrangements,
required by their social–contractual commitments to practice open science, limits their ability to maintain
separate incentives and contracting policies for biotechnology on the one hand, and for the rest of the
intellectual commons on the other.”). For contrasting views, see studies emphasizing the greater incentives,
knowledge, and resources that industry scientists have to make cumulative discoveries and to push discoveries
into development, such as Phillipe Aghion et al., Academic Freedom, Private-Sector Focus, and the Process of
Innovation, 39 RAND J. ECON. 617 (2008); Zucker et al., supra note 67, at 138–43, 149–51. For a discussion
of the tensions between the commercial and noncommercial aspects of university patenting, see Jacob H.
Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation: Tensions Between Universities and Patents and How to Fix Them, 15
YALE J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2013).
132 These characteristics are discussed in Vertinsky, supra note 131, and this Article seeks to apply them
to the context of drug discovery and development. In a subsequent paper, I explore the role of universities as
innovators in agriculture, where universities have historically played an important role in downstream
development of their discoveries.
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remaining loosely connected as a single innovation process. These separable
units can be restructured, or outsourced, without requiring major changes to the
other units. This Article borrows from the organizational literature on
modularity and asset partitioning to describe why this organizational capacity
might be advantageous in managing drug development.133 Second, these
characteristics make universities comparatively good organizations for
providing the kinds of semipublic infrastructure, such as drug discovery
facilities and software tools, and the diversified intellectual capital needed to
increase translational research capacity. Universities can harness a combination
of public and private funds, they can take advantage of the mixed knowledge
and development benefits of innovation activities, and industry players will be
more willing to share their own resources with a university than with each
other.
The first organizational advantage stems from the ability of the university
to pursue a modularizing strategy in its organization of different tasks in drug
discovery and development. Modularity, as used in the organizational
literature, refers to the ability to decompose a production process into
“components that are highly interdependent within sub-blocks, called modules,
and largely independent across those sub-blocks.”134 Within each module,
elements of the system—which may be decisions, tasks, or components—are
interdependent, and changing one will require changes in many others. Across
modules, elements are more independent and changes in one element need not
133 The growing literature on modularization, property, and intellectual property has a number of
applications to this analysis. While a systematic application of the insights from this literature to analyze
partitioning approaches within universities is beyond the scope of this Article, the discussion draws directly
and indirectly on much of this literature. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual
Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083 (2009) [hereinafter Smith, Institutions and Indirectness] (applying
information cost theory to IP and explaining how difficulty in measuring inputs and identifying likely outputs
creates advantages for placing a given activity within a module and giving control over local remodularization
to private actors, with IP allowing for this modularization through the right to exclude); Henry E. Smith,
Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007)
[hereinafter Smith, Intellectual Property] (applying information cost theory to explain how intellectual
property works, albeit imperfectly, in addressing complex coordination problems of attributing outputs to
inputs, and how exclusionary rights work by keeping entitlements over information modular); Carliss Y.
Baldwin & Joachim Henkel, The Impact of Modularity on Intellectual Property and Value Appropriation
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-040, 2011), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%
20Files/12-040_895ee04c-1533-4cac-9a4a-69ffbf794edd.pdf; Carliss Y. Baldwin & Eric von Hippel,
Modeling a Paradigm Shift: From Producer Innovation to User and Open Collaborative Innovation 7
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-038, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1502864. For insights on asset partitioning as applied to patent law, see Paul J. Heald, A
Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 480–84 (2005).
134 Baldwin & Henkel, supra note 133, at 3.
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be coordinated with changes in others.135 This can reduce the complexity of a
system and allow for greater flexibility of the system to adjust to changing
circumstances by changing one part of the process rather than by reconfiguring
the whole.136 Organizations become increasingly modular when they start to
replace hierarchical, integrated structures with more loosely connected forms
of organization.137 When a firm starts to outsource different parts of its product
development process, for example, it is shifting to a more modular production
system. The outsourced components are independent in the sense that they
need not be modified when changes are made in other parts of the production
process, and the firm can select from a range of alternative component
suppliers to satisfy its outsourced needs. In more general terms, modularity
involves breaking a process into separable blocks, referred to as modules, that
have inputs and outputs that are sufficiently well-defined such that the modules
can be “fit together and recombined into a complete process.”138 This
organizational strategy can be used to reduce complexity, allow for
specialization, minimize the effects of changes in one part of a process on the
other parts, and economize on the use of information within a production
process.
While it has been used primarily to analyze the organizational structures
and strategies of firms, modularity has also been applied to understand the
changing organizational structures and functions of universities as they pursue
different areas of focus within education and research.139 Universities
frequently create new projects, centers, interdisciplinary institutes, and
sometimes even new departments to take advantage of changes in science,
technology, or higher education.140 Existing capabilities are grouped together
in different ways as research goals change or new fields emerge. Similarly
universities dissolve these units when their functions are no longer needed or
the research or teaching is better performed elsewhere. Faculty members
within universities form their own labs, research groups, collaborations, and

135 Id. For an in-depth discussion of the concept of modularity and its application, see 1 CARLISS Y.
BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY (2000).
136 See Eric von Hippel, Task Partitioning: An Innovation Process Variable, 19 RES. POL’Y 407 (1990).
137 See, e.g., Melissa A. Schilling & H. Kevin Steensma, The Use of Modular Organizational Forms: An
Industry-Level Analysis, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1149 (2001).
138 Lloyd Armstrong, Modularity in University Higher Education, CHANGING HIGHER EDUC. (June 16,
2006), http://www.changinghighereducation.com/2006/06/modularity_in_u.html.
139 See, e.g., Lloyd Armstrong, Modularity in University Higher Education: Research, CHANGING HIGHER
EDUC. (June 16, 2006), http://www.changinghighereducation.com/2006/06/modularity_in_u_1.html.
140 See id.
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other arrangements in response to changing opportunities and the needs of the
problems they are working on.
This Article uses the concept here to illustrate how universities can
rearrange and partition their activities in ways that can support dual processes
of scientific discovery and drug development.141 Some aspects of drug
discovery and development may be conducive to open systems of innovation;
others may be more conducive to proprietary, hierarchically managed
development.142 Different funding sources will have different requirements
attached, with private investors requiring at least some forms of proprietary
development and public funders more open to alternative development modes
and goals. The nature of universities as specialized entities with knowledge
production and dissemination functions, combined with their decentralized
structure, can sustain divergent governance approaches for different kinds of
projects while leaving in place some level of shared oversight and imposing
limits on the proprietary nature of project results.143 A single innovation
process can be organized into separate projects, each project with its own
membership and rules of access to the results generated. Where the projects are
nested within a single organization, the costs of sharing information and
resources between these projects will be lower than it would be with an

141 Although beyond the scope of this paper, the ways in which universities generate and manage
intellectual property for very different purposes has interesting implications for the types of distributed
innovation systems that can be sustained. Joachim Henkel, Carliss Baldwin, and Willy Shih argue that
“managing a system’s modular structure in conjunction with its IP . . . can reconcile opportunities for
distributed innovation with . . . value [capture].” See Joachim Henkel et al., IP Modularity: Profiting from
Innovation by Aligning Product Architecture with Intellectual Property 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper
No. 13-012, 2012), available at http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/9369296/13-012.pdf?sequence=1.
This Article suggests that perhaps the university can capture and retain value in different ways and can worry
less about the appropriability of the intellectual assets of different projects where the projects take place under
the organizational umbrella of the university.
142 Differences in the innovation process may be a factor of different funding models (e.g., drug with
commercial potential funded by private sector versus drug project that is largely supported by public funders),
different starting points in the drug development process (e.g., repurposing drugs versus starting with a new
drug candidate), and different technologies.
143 This touches on a related and very relevant literature on intellectual property and the boundaries of the
firm, including work by Robert Merges, Dan Burk, Joe Miller, Scott Kieff, Paul Heald, and many others. See,
e.g., Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights
at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575 (examining the role of IP in balancing resource
allocation needs within the firm and between firms); Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and
Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351 (2007) (discussing the role
of IP in allowing access lock-in to facilitate the joint development and use of standards).
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outsourcing approach, and the projects can be more readily reconfigured as
dictated by the needs of the innovation process.144
This flexibility allows for the possibility of reengineering the drug
discovery and development process in ways that protect both the development
of knowledge and the development of drugs. Information and discoveries may
have applications for both further research and narrower drug development
objectives, and these different uses can be simultaneously pursued by different
units within the university. “[S]eparate modules can be worked on
independently and in parallel” without costly communication across
modules.145 Where knowledge is sticky—costly and difficult to move between
locations—efforts can be made to shift the locus of innovation to where the
knowledge is the stickiest by designing the different modules in light of this
constraint.146 Where the research opportunities offered by a particular project
are reduced, or the project requires capabilities that the university does not
have, the university can collaborate with a third party or outsource the project
without having to revisit and reorganize the structure of other connecting
projects. Moreover, the university can adapt the modules and the boundaries
between the modules in ways that reflect both commercial and public
knowledge production processes.147 Intellectual property licensing, rules
governing access to and sharing of information created within a module, and
flexibilities in the design of incentive structures and working spaces
characterizing different modules provide important tools for adjusting these
boundaries.
144 This is not to say that reorganization of activities within the university is either easy or costless, and
universities exhibit institutional inertia just as private firms do—in some ways even more inertia than private
firms. But where we think of innovation processes that take advantage of existing institutional structures, such
as research facilities and a development facility, it may be relatively easier to break up a larger project into
pieces that occur within the university rather than to divide them between different entities. Moreover,
universities have some institutional competence to support fluid research projects and research portfolios.
145 Baldwin & von Hippel, supra note 133, at 7.
146 See Eric von Hippel, “Sticky Information” and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for
Innovation, 40 MGMT. SCI. 429 (1994).
147 By focusing on the innovation process as a process of knowledge production and sharing, we can take
advantage of the insights from a growing literature on knowledge commons. From this literature we get ideas
of why universities might offer comparative advantages as organizations for conducting drug development in a
process that is increasingly focused on new ways of producing and sharing knowledge. See, e.g., Elinor
Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons, in UNDERSTANDING
KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 41 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007).
Universities can also incorporate public interest terms into the conditions that they impose on downstream
developers of their technologies. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An
Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1039 (2005) (proposing
that public-sector institutions adopt equitable access principles when licensing medical technologies).
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If we take seriously the increasingly dual nature of the knowledge
generated in drug development as socially and commercially valuable, then
regarding drug development as not just a commercial process but also a
science—a “translational science”—makes sense. In this case, the university—
as knowledge commons, knowledge curator, knowledge producer, and industry
partner—becomes a natural site for locating translational science.148 As
translational science becomes more established and accepted as an academic
pursuit, we can imagine ways of judging the results of processes that have both
scientific and commercial applications in new ways. Efforts at expanding
tenure standards to reward patents and start-up activities is only one way, and
perhaps not the best way, of adapting incentive schemes to reflect the dual
nature of activities in translational spaces.149 By clearly identifying activities as
falling in the translational space, perhaps universities will also be better able to
protect spaces for research directed solely at adding to the body of
foundational knowledge. As research projects change, the ways in which they
are governed can also change, allowing for shifts between different kinds of
basic and applied research and development.
In addition to advantages in managing the needs of dual-natured activities,
universities may be better placed than firms and the government to make
decisions about how to handle the results of such activities, particularly where
they are involved in both discovery and development. They have the potential
to make more balanced decisions about patenting, licensing, and preserving
access than private firms and government. This advantage stems from the fact
that universities can and must reconcile competing interests in financial
sustainability, practicality, and future research interests when managing each
148 The idea of translational research as a science has been a centerpiece of the NIH vision of modern drug
discovery and development. See Collins, supra note 1, at 2. For the notion of university as knowledge curator,
see Michael J. Madison, Knowledge Curation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957 (2011) [hereinafter Madison,
Knowledge Curation]. For the notion of university as cultural or knowledge commons, see Michael J. Madison
et al., The University as Constructed Cultural Commons, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365 (2009). For the role
of universities in creating infrastructure critical in science and technology policies, see Brett M. Frischmann,
Commercializing University Research Systems in Economic Perspective: A View from the Demand Side, in
UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 155 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).
149 Texas A&M University became one of the first public universities in the United States to formally
incorporate commercialization factors into its tenure process. Commercialization Added to Tenure Criteria,
Boosts Flow of Inventions, TECH. TRANSFER TACTICS, Oct. 2007, at 82. The University of Maryland also
recently adapted its tenure criteria to include reflections of patenting. See Best Practices in Transforming
Research into Innovation: Creative Approaches to the Bayh–Dole Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Tech. & Innovation of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 112th Cong. 7–8 (2012) (statement of Robert A.
Rosenbaum, President & Executive Director, Maryland Technology Development Corporation).
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stage of the discovery and development process.150 They can use
organizational strategies to manage tensions between these competing interests
and to protect core knowledge production processes. The university’s ability to
pursue separate operations with different orientations under a single umbrella
can be harnessed, for example, to balance the needs and demands of both open
science and proprietary drug development by choosing the least restrictive
knowledge management practices necessary to preserve development
opportunities.
Given the range of funding sources and the mix of monetary and
nonmonetary benefits that universities have available, they may also be able to
pursue research and development activities that are focused more on unmet
medical needs and less on commercial market size.151 To the extent that the
governing mission can remain directed at knowledge production rather than
profit maximization, project decision making can and will diverge from that of
a private firm. The university and its principal investigators will benefit from
nonmonetary by-products, such as a paper in a top peer-reviewed journal about
a path-breaking advance in treating malaria, in a way that commercial firms do
not. Publication of a new scientific advancement can count for more in the
university than in either government or the private sector, making risk taking in
markets with limited commercial potential more feasible. Other forms of
nonmonetary benefits, including intrinsic benefits to principal investigators
motivated to pursue humanitarian goals and scientific interests, can offset
lower economic rewards.
Even with the best of intentions, requiring development activities to be
financially self-sustainable will inevitably slant project selection toward more
lucrative projects. The bias toward money-making ventures in a time of
shrinking university budgets may dominate unless significant philanthropic or
government money is provided and sufficient mechanisms for policing and
rewarding efforts to pursue projects with high social returns, but potentially
low or lower commercial returns, are put in place. While economic concerns
will be impossible to escape, universities nevertheless remain good places to
experiment with alternative ways of pursuing and funding development for
150

Peter Lee, Interface: The Push and Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2225, 2230–31 (2009)
(exploring the ways in which the unique institutional contexts of universities can inform their patenting and
technology transfer practices in ways that can reflect a “push” of nonmarket goals).
151 The role of philanthropic funding will be particularly important in supporting this avenue of
development. See Fiona Murray, Evaluating the Role of Science Philanthropy in American Research
Universities, 13 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 23 (2013).
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those drugs with limited economic returns but high social welfare payoffs.
Their public knowledge function, combined with their flexibility to pursue
focused development projects, will make universities attractive to funders
providing the kinds of socially oriented funding needed to support socially
important projects.
This is not to say that universities will get the balance between public and
private interests in drug discovery and development right, and indeed what
balance is the “right” one is itself a contested subject. This Article’s claim is
only that the organizational structure of the university provides opportunities
for decision making that is more informed by the interest of balancing financial
sustainability, socially beneficial project choice, and public access than the
same decisions would be if made by firms, government entities, or even
existing forms of public–academic–private collaborations.152
The second advantage conferred by the combination of characteristics
discussed above is that the distinctive characteristics of universities give them
the capability to be good at creating and providing access to the kinds of public
infrastructure—inventions and other kinds of knowledge, data, and physical
resources and facilities—needed to increase translational research capacity.153
Images of paths, roads, and bridges—traditional sources of public
infrastructure—pervade the recent roadmaps of government agencies charged
with seeking ways to improve the outlook of the biomedical industry.154 This is
no surprise, as many of the government efforts currently underway to support
drug development are essentially investments in public infrastructure,
construed broadly to encompass not just physical facilities but also intangibles
that are inputs into research and development processes. The NIH Chemical
Genomics Center—with its assay development, high-throughput screening, and
chemistry technologies—and the NCATS Pharmaceutical Collection—a
publicly accessible database of small-molecule compounds useful in

152 Interesting parallels can be drawn to the considerations that inform university enforcement of their
intellectual property rights. See, e.g., Jacob H. Rooksby, When Tigers Bare Teeth: A Qualitative Study of
University Patent Enforcement, 46 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
153 See generally Brett M. Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143, 2167 (2009)
(exploring how “university science and technology research systems perform economically as infrastructural
capital”); Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39 (2008) (exploring the
concept of intellectual infrastructure in IP law and suggesting IP laws can be used to provide access to
productivity-enabling intellectual infrastructure).
154 See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL ET AL., A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION: SECURING OUR
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 3 (2011) (describing a national innovation strategy based on public
investments in physical and human capital as “infrastructure” to support innovation).
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repurposing strategies—provide important examples of this kind of public
infrastructure.155 In many ways universities are themselves public
infrastructure.156 They produce and disseminate knowledge that forms the
foundation for both further knowledge creation and the development of new
products. They develop research facilities that the private sector can take
advantage of through sponsored research, collaborations, or other forms of
formal and informal academic–industry partnerships and networking. They
train students who go on to become part of the workforce.
The case for public support of traditional kinds of public infrastructure,
such as roads and bridges, and to a lesser degree newer forms of intangible
public infrastructure, such as basic scientific research, is well understood.157
Federal government involvement in research and development stems largely
from the policy view that technological innovation is a key determinant of
economic growth and that some of the inputs into technological innovation are
public goods that will be undersupplied by the private market.158 The U.S.
government is estimated to have invested $147.4 billion for research and
development in 2010, excluding American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
funding.159 This funding is used not just for specified missions of federal
departments, such as defense, public health, and environmental quality, but
also to support work in areas where there is an identified need for research and
development that is not being performed by the private sector.160 Providing the
capacity to move certain kinds of inventions through the innovation process,
particularly those with significant public benefit but inadequate private returns,
is increasingly viewed as having a public-good component. But finding
publicly acceptable and socially efficient ways of supporting the existing,
primarily private, drug development process has proven difficult. Many policy

155

See generally NCATS Pharmaceutical Collection, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL
SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/tools/preclinical/npc/pharmaceutical-collection.html (last visited May
8, 2013); NIH Chemical Genomics Center, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI.,
www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/ncgc/ncgc.html (last visited May 8, 2013).
156 Frischmann, supra note 153.
157 See generally FRISCHMANN, supra note 121.
158 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE IN CONSULTATION WITH NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, THE
COMPETITIVENESS AND INNOVATIVE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED STATES, at v (2012), available at http://www.
commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2012/january/competes_010511_0.pdf.
159 See, e.g., SARGENT, supra note 7; WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32324, FEDERAL
R&D, DRUG DISCOVERY, AND PRICING: INSIGHTS FROM THE NIH-UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIP 2
(2011).
160 WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33528, INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS AND
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT: DEBATE OVER GOVERNMENT POLICY 1–2 (2009).
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makers and their taxpaying constituents object to injections of public money
into a process that will yield private drugs owned and sold by private
companies.161 While taxpayers have become accustomed to paying for
university research, even when the university is able to retain rights to resulting
discoveries and license them to private companies, they are less comfortable
with subsidizing the development costs for a pharmaceutical company
pursuing a new drug.162
Efforts to subsidize private development costs have therefore taken the
more subtle form of public support for university and government development
capacity that is made available for private use. The NIH has focused its
translational research efforts on the development of NIH-supported public
infrastructure. A good example is the NIH Common Fund’s Molecular
Libraries and Imaging program.163 This program provides biomedical
researchers with access to large-scale screening facilities needed to identify
small molecules that can be refined and used as chemical probes to study the
functions of genes, cells, and other aspects of disease pathways.164 The
facilities can also be used by public- and private-sector researchers to validate
new drug targets.165 Universities, with their nonprofit status and public
knowledge mission, are palatable sites for this kind of public investment in
development infrastructure. In some cases, it is private actors that are taking
the lead in building their own shared resources.166 But in many cases research

161 Indeed, this view that publicly funded research should remain open and available to the public was one
of the biggest hurdles to the passage of the Bayh–Dole Act in 1980. See Mowery & Sampat, supra note 45.
The same sentiment has supported proposals for payback provisions in federal funding legislation and
proposals to limit the prices of prescription drugs that were developed using federal funds. Ashley J. Stevens,
The Enactment of Bayh–Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 96 (2004).
162 See, e.g., Scott J. Wallsten, The R&D Boondoggle, REGULATION, Winter 2000, at 12; see also
Taxpayer Access to Research, ALLIANCE FOR TAXPAYER ACCESS, http://www.taxpayeraccess.org/issues/
access/index.shtml (last visited May 8, 2013).
163 See Molecular Libraries and Imaging, NIH COMMON FUND, www.commonfund.nih.gov/
molecularlibraries (last updated Mar. 18, 2013) (describing the NIH Common Fund Molecular Libraries and
Imaging program).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Examples include pharmaceutical company collaborations to share information about failures in
clinical testing as a way of allowing all of the companies to identify their own failures earlier in the
development process, as well as “precompetitive” collaborations such as the Biomarkers Consortium. The
Biomarkers Consortium is a public–private biomedical research partnership managed by the Foundation for
the NIH. This consortium is designed to develop and qualify biomarkers that will be useful in diagnosing and
treating disease. The results of the project are to be made broadly available to the entire scientific community.
See, e.g., JA Wagner et al., The Biomarkers Consortium: Practice and Pitfalls of Open-Source Precompetitive
Collaboration, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 539 (2010) (evaluating Biomarkers
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collaborations involve universities because industry players are more
comfortable sharing their data with a university than with a competitor, or
because universities provide the complementary skills that other industry
partners do not. Moreover, the public investments made in such university
projects can be justified in terms of dual contributions to research and to
development, and the costs of such investments can be spread over many
different projects.167 This role of universities as neutral sites for industry
collaboration contributes to the drug development infrastructure.
B. University Experiments with Changing Roles in Pharmaceutical
Innovation
While many U.S. research universities are experiencing pressures and
exploring opportunities to move beyond traditional roles, there is significant
variation in the nature and scope of their responses.168 The experiments that
universities undertake are determined largely by their existing resources and
areas of expertise, although their institutional histories and cultures also play a
determinative role. Most, if not all, of the significant experiments in drug
development are being undertaken by a relatively small number of large
research universities. While a survey and categorization of all the university
experiments in drug discovery and development currently taking place is
beyond the scope of this Article, this section briefly canvasses some of the
initiatives to illustrate the ways in which universities are experimenting with
innovation capacity.
This section loosely categorizes these experiments in terms of levels of
ownership in, control over, and financial commitment to the drug development
process as a way of illustrating the degree of departure from traditional
university roles.169 The first level simply extends the research capabilities that
Consortium as an example of precompetitive collaboration among pharmaceutical companies); RL Woosley et
al., Commentary, The Critical Path Institute’s Approach to Precompetitive Sharing and Advancing Regulatory
Science, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 530 (2010) (discussing shift among pharmaceutical
companies toward data sharing).
167 This relates to the notion of university investments in systems of technology development and transfer
as public infrastructure. See Frischmann, supra note 148.
168 Research universities vary significantly in terms of how they approach and engage in post-discovery
development initiatives. See, e.g., Argyres & Liebeskind, supra note 131; Rosa Grimaldi et al., 30 Years After
Bayh–Dole: Reassessing Academic Entrepreneurship, 40 RES. POL’Y 1045 (2011) (examining aspects of
academic entrepreneurship).
169 There are many different ways in which university experiments with drug discovery and development
capacity could be organized, and alternative schematics for understanding university–industry involvement
have been provided in the literature. See Bronwyn H. Hall, University–Industry Research Partnerships in the
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universities already have to explore some low-hanging fruit in drug discovery.
It involves relatively little ownership of, control over, or financial
responsibility for the post-discovery development process on the part of the
university, and applications to drug development are largely byproducts rather
than project goals. The second level involves some form of cost sharing and
risk sharing for projects which have a development focus and some level of
decision making, particularly in the early stages of post-discovery
development. But ownership and control of the development process are still
largely managed outside the university. The third level of experiments takes
the university into a position of financial and managerial responsibility for, and
governance of, development projects, although this position may be shared
with other actors. Along with the greater control and financial responsibility
come opportunities for a larger share of the returns from products that succeed.
Expansion of university control over development projects, as well as
university discretion in selecting which projects to push downstream, is in
many cases limited by the need to retain industry interest in the projects being
undertaken. Some universities are engaged at multiple levels, often focusing on
one or two disease areas at a deeper development level while engaging in
applied research and developing certain drug discovery and development
capabilities more generally across other areas. This section describes a small
sample of university initiatives here to illustrate the different levels of
university governance of drug development and the opportunities and limits of
these different levels.170
The first and most common level of involvement is investment in specific
types of discovery capacity that expand on the university’s underlying research
strengths. Where a university has strengths in medicinal and synthetic
chemistry, for example, developing facilities that support hit-to-lead chemistry

United States 5–6 (Feb. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/
BHH04_Kansai.pdf (exploring recent U.S. experience with the various types of university–industry research
relationships, including reasons they have increased, the evidence on their performance, and the tensions that
have emerged between public and private interests in the academic research process, focusing in particular on
tensions between appropriating and diffusing knowledge). The levels of involvement discussed here are
designed to correlate with the degree of financial investment and control that the university has in the drug
development process.
170 The framework used here is based on how much development activity the university assumes and
controls, but there are many other ways of categorizing and comparing universities and their development
roles. Universities may be effective at creating start-up companies, for example, or at generating entrepreneurs.
See, e.g., MILNE & MALINS, supra note 114 (categorizing landscape of academic–industry partnerships).
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is a natural investment with payoffs for both research and development.171
Where the university has strengths in computational chemistry, molecular
modeling capacity may be a natural extension.172 Increased availability and
familiarity and reduced cost of certain technologies, such as high-throughput
screening, have bridged the gap between drug research and drug discovery and
spurred university investments in discovery capacity.173 Screening centers for
small molecules, many of which include a variety of expensive screening and
computational design facilities and corresponding capabilities, have been
developed in a number of the major U.S. research universities.174 The Penn
Center for Molecular Discovery at the University of Pennsylvania is one such
example.175 These facilities are used by researchers from the University of
Pennsylvania to further drug-discovery-related research. The center draws on
and contributes to a large public domain database, PubChem, where
interactions between an NIH small-molecule repository and thousands of
biological candidates can be data mined. Northwestern University has
developed ChemCore, an equipment-intensive shared facility that provides
medicinal and synthetic chemistry, molecular modeling, and compound
purification services to research investigators both within Northwestern

171 Hit-to-lead chemistry refers to the move from finding chemical compounds that modify a particular
target relevant to a disease process (hits) to selecting and refining the most promising compound in the hopes
of turning it into a drug. See, e.g., Hit-to-Lead Chemistry, SMALL MOLECULE DISCOVERY CENTER,
https://smdc.ucsf.edu/chemistry/hit.htm (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing hit-to-lead chemistry by the
Small Molecule Discovery Center at the University of California San Francisco (UCSF)).
172 See, e.g., Gerald M. Maggiora, Is There a Future for Computational Chemistry in Drug Research?, 26
J. COMPUTER-AIDED MOLECULAR DESIGN 87 (2012).
173 See, e.g., Ricardo Macarron et al., Impact of High-Throughput Screening in Biomedical Research, 10
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 188, 194 (2011) (noting high-throughput screening uses for experimental as
well as purely commercial purposes and the role of university facilities). The shift of knowledge from industry
into universities has contributed to the expansion of academic drug discovery capacity. See Kotz, supra note
127; Macarron et al., supra, at 193. “‘The expertise in small molecule drug discovery that has traditionally
resided in industry is being integrated into academia. The result is that you’ve brought what industry is good at
and juxtaposed it with innovative targets and disease-specific knowledge,’ both of which are areas of strength
for academia,” according to Stephen Frye, previously the worldwide vice president of discovery medicinal
chemistry at GlaxoSmithKline PLC and now director of the Center of Integrative Chemical Biology and Drug
Discovery at the University of North Carolina Eshelman School of Pharmacy. See Kotz, supra note 127, at 1.
174 See, e.g., Kotz, supra note 127, at 1 (discussing study done by Stephen Frye); High-Throughput
Screening, JP SULZBERGER COLUM. GENOME CENTER, http://genomecenter.columbia.edu/index.php?q=node/
20 (last visited May 8, 2013); High Throughput Screening (HTS), SCRIPPS RES. INST., www.scripps.edu/
florida/technologies/hts/index.html (last visited May 8, 2013); High Throughput Screening Laboratory, U.
KAN., www.hts.ku.edu (last visited May 8, 2013); Penn Center for Molecular Discovery, U. PA.,
www.seas.upenn.edu/~pcmd/ (last visited May 8, 2013).
175 See Penn Center for Molecular Discovery, supra note 174.
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University and externally.176 Many of the facilities and capabilities that are
developed are supported in part by government and philanthropic
organizations, and many are made available to users outside of the university
on a fee-for-service basis.177 In these kinds of experiments with drug discovery
capacity, the university ultimately ends up with relatively little control over
and stake in the downstream drug development process.
Experiments at this first level can be successful at reducing the costs of
certain activities by taking advantage of scale economies in facilities that can
be used for more than one research program. Universities can also support
facilities that have high research value combined with practical product
development value, addressing problems of private sector undersupply. By
increasing the physical proximity of different users of a facility to each other
and by reducing organizational barriers to their interaction, these initiatives
may foster greater information sharing and can be used as the basis for
collaborations between entities with complementary skills. Ultimately,
however, experiments at this level are unlikely to do much to move drug
candidates past the early discovery stage. They are limited in scope to specific
parts of the drug discovery process—often those parts that are in closest
proximity to traditional university research functions. They do not
fundamentally change the cost and risk profiles of drug development.
Moreover, they do not address the challenges of incentivizing and promoting
information production and transfer in later stages of development where
research benefits are more limited and departures from traditional university
research activities are more significant.

176 ChemCore, CENTER FOR MOLECULAR INNOVATION & DRUG DISCOVERY, http://www.cmidd.
northwestern.edu/chemcore (last visited May 8, 2013).
177 See, e.g., MILNE & MALINS, supra note 114 (categorizing landscape of academic–industry
partnerships). Although the focus of the discussion in this Article is on discovering new therapeutics,
universities can and do play interesting roles in other aspects of drug innovation. As one example,
approximately five universities have been able to leverage their capabilities in industrial and physical
pharmacy in university-affiliated pharmaceutical facilities. These include the Chao Center for Industrial
Pharmacy and Contract Manufacturing, linked to Purdue University, and the University of Iowa
Pharmaceuticals Development Consortium. See Chao Center for Industrial Pharmacy and Contract
Manufacturing, United States of America, PHARMACEUTICAL-TECHNOLOGY.COM, http://www.pharmaceuticaltechnology.com/projects/chao (last visited May 8, 2013); UI Development Consortium Develops Drugs,
Dosages for Clinical Studies, INST. FOR CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. U. IOWA (May 7, 2009, 2:58 PM),
http://www.icts.uiowa.edu/content/ui-development-consortium-develops-drugs-dosages-clinical-studies.
As
processes of drug discovery and development change, these kinds of downstream university involvement are
likely to expand as well.

VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1

784

6/3/2013 10:13 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:741

In the second category are universities that have moved beyond investment
in facilities to support research and academic–industry collaborations, and
have invested in establishing and financially supporting one or more central
locations for drug discovery and development. The creation of academic drug
discovery and development centers within universities is a relatively new and
emerging phenomenon, and much of our knowledge about these initiatives
takes the form of anecdotal data.178 A web search reveals that 92 out of the top
114 U.S. research universities claim to have some kind of translational
research initiative.179 Many of these claims, however, simply reflect a
relabeling or recharacterization of existing research projects. About 37 of these
universities have a drug discovery or development center that has its own
administrative staff, faculty, and a concerted drug discovery and development
strategy.180 These centers generally involve, at a minimum, bringing together
in a common space a group of university employees who are engaged in
different aspects of drug discovery and development. The University of
Pittsburg (Pitt), currently the sixth-ranked NIH-funded institution, was a
relatively early mover.181 It created a Drug Discovery Institute in 2006 that
draws on multiple schools and departments within the university as well as its
affiliated academic medical center to generate the capacity to translate basic
research into clinical practice.182 The institute provides a centralized facility
and core staff with a combination of academic and industrial experience that
are designed to help both academic and industry collaborators translate
promising ideas from basic science into a form useful for more focused drug

178 This is starting to change. A recent survey of seventy-five such entities provided some interesting
insights into these organizations and how they are funded, how they operate, and other aspects of their drug
discovery efforts. See Frye et al., supra note 127, at 409.
179 The 114 institutions are selected based on data collected by the Center for Measuring University
Performance. See CENTER FOR MEASURING U. PERFORMANCE, http://mup.asu.edu (last visited May 8, 2013).
These rough numbers are calculated based on whether the university web site includes a drug discovery
initiative, either in the form of an institute or a center. See Frye et al., supra note 127, at 409–10 (noting study
done at the University of North Carolina analyzing status of small molecule drug discovery in academia).
180 This is an approximate measure based on information provided by the 114 institutions on their web
sites. The Drug Discovery Institute at the University of Pittsburgh provides one such example. It has its own
space, a range of facilities, and an administrative and lab staff focused on drug discovery capabilities. See U.
PITT. DRUG DISCOVERY INST., http://www.upddi.pitt.edu (last visited May 8, 2013).
181 UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH SCH. OF MED., UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE 2011/12
FACT BOOK 3 (2011).
182 See About UPDDI, U. PITT. DRUG DISCOVERY INST., http://www.upddi.pitt.edu/index.php?page=
overview2 (last visited May 8, 2013).
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discovery.183 In addition to this collaboration function, the core staff also
supports experiments with drug development through projects such as
developing and applying technologies in the design and synthesis of drugs.184
Intellectual property generated by university participants is managed by the
university office of technology management according to regular university
policy.185 Vanderbilt University’s activities with drug development provide
another example of efforts to provide the kind of drug development
infrastructure traditionally found only in pharmaceutical companies.186 Most of
the academic drug discovery centers, such as the Center for Integrative
Chemical Biology and Drug Discovery at the University of North Carolina
(UNC), stop at earlier stages of the discovery process.187
As the private business model of drug development shifts to a fail-earlyand-often model, one that is more discovery intensive and experimental, the
overlap between the facilities important in research and facilities important to

183

Shannon Barnes, Spotlight on Research: Top-Notch Researchers Propel Pitt’s Drug Discovery
Institute, PITTCHRONICLE (July 18, 2011), http://chronicle2.pitt.edu/?p=8922 (“Over the years, DDI has
expanded to a high-production facility, capable of holding as many as five million chemical compounds and
equipped with more than 10 robots for automated assay plating, giving researchers virtually infinite drugscreening opportunities. Its faculty members hail primarily from three Pitt schools—the School of Arts and
Sciences, the School of Medicine, and the School of Pharmacy—and create a unique mosaic of scientists, from
organic chemists to clinical scientists, who work along the continuum of drug discovery.”).
184 See U. PITT. DRUG DISCOVERY INST., supra note 180.
185 Intellectual Property, U. PITT. DRUG DISCOVERY INST., http://www.upddi.pitt.edu/index.php?page=ip
(last visited May 8, 2013).
186 Vanderbilt’s efforts include the Vanderbilt Center for Neuroscience Drug Discovery (VCNDD) and
the Vanderbilt Clinical and Translational Research Center (VICTR). See Clinical Research Center Overview,
VAND. U. MED. CENTER, http://www.mc.vanderbilt.edu/crc/ (last visited May 8, 2013); VAND. CENTER FOR
NEUROSCIENCE DRUG DISCOVERY, http://www.vcndd.com (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the center as
a “new model for neuroscience drug discovery”). VCNDD’s stated mission is to “promote translation of
advances in basic science to novel therapeutics by [de-risking] efforts focused on novel approaches for
treatment of serious brain disorders.” P. Jeffrey Conn, Translation of Research Across Disciplines to Impact
Patient Care, VAND. CENTER FOR NEUROSCIENCE DRUG DISCOVERY, http://www.vcndd.com/presentations/
Translationofresearchacrossdisciplinestoimpactpatientcare.pdf (last visited May 8, 2013). This center has 100
full-time employees and investment in drug development infrastructure traditionally found only in
pharmaceutical companies. It draws on Vanderbilt’s other research capabilities, including a number of centers
that are relevant to different aspects of drug development. Its funding is predominantly from NIH but also
includes major private and philanthropic funding. The VICTR, which is funded in part by the NIH CTSA
program, is a virtual home for Vanderbilt’s clinical and translational research—in other words, it is not a
physical space, but a coordinating mechanism for linking together relevant Vanderbilt projects and facilities.
187 See Center for Integrative Chemical Biology and Drug Discovery, UNC ESHELMAN SCH. PHARMACY,
http://www.pharmacy.unc.edu/research/centers/center-for-integrative-chemical-biology-and-drug-discovery/
(last visited May 8, 2013). The capabilities of this center include assay development, medicinal chemistry,
computational chemistry, and compound screening. Target proposals seeking use of these capabilities come
from the UNC faculty. Id.
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more commercially focused drug discovery and development increases. As a
result, drug discovery research collaborations between the university and
pharmaceutical companies have increased in size and scope.188 Some of these
academic–industry collaborations have raised concerns among stakeholders in
public science because of the expansive intellectual property rights that are
sometimes conferred on industry partners.189 An interesting question for
further exploration is whether the conflicts between public knowledge and
private knowledge are larger or smaller when the university is itself in control
of development rather than only the recipient of funding and shared resources
in exchange for broad option rights. Another question for further exploration is
whether a change in the university’s role in commercial activities will
negatively impact its relationship with industry partners that currently view
them as noncompetitors.
In contrast to the more limited experiments at the first level of involvement,
these broader initiatives begin to address challenges of cost and risk sharing by
supporting later stages of drug discovery using a mix of public, private, and
university resources. The creation of a university-governed or joint university–
industry-governed center focused on biomedical translational research, if done
properly, can be used to reduce both geographical and organizational barriers
to the translation of knowledge into products and to take advantage of the
organizational capabilities that universities have in managing mixed processes
of public and private knowledge creation.190 Collaborative structures that deal
effectively with intellectual property ownership and use rights at the start of
the collaboration may be able to create joint research spaces that foster greater
sharing of information while also ensuring that investments in the

188 See, e.g., Frye et al., supra note 127, at 409–10 (noting study done at University of North Carolina
analyzing status of small molecule drug discovery in academia); Ashley J. Stevens et al., The Role of PublicSector Research in the Discovery of Drugs and Vaccines, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 535 (2011) (examining
expanded role of public sector in applied research phase of drug discovery).
189 See, e.g., Josephine Johnston, Conflict of Interest in Biomedical Research, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH
AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS,
AND CAMPAIGNS 31, 31–34 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008); Richard S. Saver, Is It Really All About the Money?
Reconsidering Non-Financial Interests in Medical Research, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 467 (2012) (discussing
both financial and nonfinancial conflicts of interest in medical research); see also Lyman, supra note 115
(discussing the dangers inherent in trends toward broader umbrella arrangements between pharma and
academia, including pharma–university department alliances).
190 See, e.g., Donna M. Huryn, Drug Discovery in an Academic Setting: Playing to the Strengths, 4 ACS
MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY LETTERS 313 (2013) (highlighting the unique ability of universities to engage in drug
discovery because of their ability to engage in risky projects and to bring deep expertise to bear, but expressing
caution about universities simply recreating the pharma model inside the university).
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collaboration can be captured and allocated more easily.191 Developmentoriented research centers can provide mechanisms for rewarding continued
participation by both university investigators and industry participants.
Despite the promise of these collaborative models, however, disconnects
between the ultimate interests of the university and its researchers and the
interests of the commercial partners often remain.192 While organizational
barriers to the sharing and transfer of information may be reduced through
collaborative structures, they are difficult to remove completely. Differences in
incentive structures, motivations, and cultures between academic and industry
participants reinforce these barriers.193 These problems make many university–
industry collaborations difficult to sustain and challenging to expand beyond
focused areas in which research and development interests are substantially
aligned. Finally, these kinds of collaborations do not adequately address the
tensions between appropriability of knowledge and disclosure of knowledge,
and in many cases the private development interests in appropriability of
knowledge win out over the more diffuse, and in many cases unidentified,
public interests in disclosure.194 Moreover, the agenda for research and
development will still be largely determined by the industry partner, since the
university has to attract and retain the industry partner.
In the third category are the very small number of universities that are
trying to internalize the financial and managerial aspects of moving from
191 See, e.g., Sherer, supra note 111 (noting the critical role of collaboration between stakeholders,
including industry and academic researchers, at every stage of therapeutic development in enabling
translational research and development). Greater sharing of information between universities and their industry
partners may also create risks, however, particularly if research results are treated as proprietary and access is
limited. How the collaborations are structured becomes critical in determining whether the collaboration
enhances or detracts from the university’s public knowledge mission. See LAWRENCE BUSCH ET AL., INST. FOR
FOOD & AGRIC. STANDARDS, EXTERNAL REVIEW OF THE COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH AGREEMENT BETWEEN
NOVARTIS AGRICULTURAL DISCOVERY INSTITUTE, INC. AND THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
50, 142–43 (2004) (using a controversial collaboration between Novartis Agricultural Discovery Institute and
the University of California, Berkley to examine broader challenges of university–industry collaboration and
the need to protect the core principles of the university, identified as creativity, autonomy, and diversity, when
engaging in such collaborations).
192 See, e.g., Michael Rosenblatt, How Academia and the Pharmaceutical Industry Can Work Together,
10 ANNALS AM. THORACIC SOC’Y 31 (2013) (discussing some of the barriers to academic–industry
collaboration from an industry perspective); John Hudson & Hanan F. Khazragui, Into the Valley of Death:
Research to Innovation, 18 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY (forthcoming 2013) (noting the challenges of academic–
industry collaboration).
193 See Rosenblatt, supra note 192; see also Huryn, supra note 190 (noting that culture in academia that
encourages and rewards individual accomplishments makes collaboration challenging and conflicting views of
goals, priorities, and credit often difficult to resolve).
194 See Merges, supra note 119, at 183.
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discovery through development. These efforts are most pronounced in public
universities that work in cooperation with, and experience more pressures
from, local and state governments as part of a concerted economic
development plan. One example of this more holistic approach to moving from
discovery to market through collaborative support structures is the Maryland
Drug Discovery and Development Network and its member institutions, which
include Johns Hopkins University and the University of Maryland.195 The
network pieces together and provides support for various activities involved in
drug development. Member institutions such as the University of Maryland
also offer incubator lab and office space and other business-related support
services.196 Similarly, the Georgia Institute of Technology has adopted a
comparatively holistic approach toward translational research. Its efforts
include proof-of-concept centers and incubator spaces designed to move
promising discoveries to a point where they are more attractive to private
investors.197
The University of California San Francisco (UCSF) goes further than most
other research institutions in its involvement in the entire drug discovery and
development process.198 UCSF’s Institute for Neurodegenerative Diseases in

195 See The Maryland Drug Discovery and Development Network, MD. BIOTECHNOLOGY CENTER,
http://marylandbiocenter.org/businessdevelopment/Pages/marylanddrugdiscoverynetwork.aspx (last visited
May 8, 2013).
196 Id.
197 See, e.g., Translational Research, GA. TECH. C. ENGINEERING, http://www.coe.gatech.edu/content/
translational-research (last visited May 8, 2013). Georgia Tech has a number of initiatives geared toward the
development of medical devices and medical therapies, many of them involving collaborations with Emory
University and other local medical centers. These initiatives include the Georgia Tech Translational Research
Institute for Biomedical Engineering and Science (TRIBES). TRIBES is a collaborative entity that has as its
focus the provision of early-stage engineering, product development expertise, and other support services
targeted at developing and implementing engineering solutions needed to move medical technology into
clinical practice. See id.
198 See About Us, CTSI UCSF, http://ind.ucsf.edu/ind/aboutus (last visited May 8, 2013). UCSF branches
out into multiple aspects of drug discovery and development. See, e.g., About CDDS, CENTER FOR DRUG DEV.
SCI., http://bts.ucsf.edu/cdds/about/ (last updated Mar. 21, 2007) (“The overall mission of the center is to
establish clinical drug development science as a rigorous academic discipline for advancing new scientific
methodologies, to contribute to the education of scientists engaged in clinical evaluation of drugs, and to
provide solutions to real-world drug development problems.”); Kristen Bole, UCSF Enters Drug Discovery
Agreement with Genentech, UCSF (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.ucsf.edu/news/2010/02/4369/ucsf-enters-drugdiscovery-agreement-genentech (noting collaboration between UCSF and Genentech with intent of generating
drug candidates, different from traditional licensing and collaboration arrangements); Jeffrey Norris, UCSF
Scientists Play Key Role in Success of Yervoy, a New Cancer Drug, UCSF (May 5, 2011), http://www.ucsf.
edu/news/2011/05/9803/ucsf-scientists-play-key-role-success-yervoy-new-cancer-drug; Research Excellence
1, UCSF, http://www.ucsf.edu/research/research-excellence (last visited May 8, 2013).
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particular focuses on the entire drug discovery process.199 The institute aims to
discover new medicines for neurodegenerative diseases by performing steps
from the hypothesis-generation stage of drug discovery to phase II clinical
trials.200 UCSF has also fashioned new joint departments, such as its
Department of Bioengineering and Therapeutic Sciences, with a focus on the
issues that arise along the full continuum of the drug development process.201
This redesign of disciplines in light of both research and development
objectives is a hallmark of those universities most actively engaged in
expanding their downstream capabilities in biomedicine.
This last level of involvement takes the university farthest along the drug
development path. Universities assume some level of ownership, control,
responsibility, and risk for selecting which projects to pursue and for directing
at least some parts of the post-discovery drug development process. In return,
universities have greater control over the intellectual property generated and
also reap a larger share of the rewards from the development of successful
medical therapies. Rather than a university-directed initiative, however, most
involve collaboration with and decision-making input from government and
industry partners.202 Multiple players with divergent interests and incentives
share the decision making about which projects to support at early stages of
innovation, and once in the commercial pipeline, private interests are likely to
dominate. Moreover, the processes of academic research and commercial
development are still largely divided between different organizations, and the
boundaries around projects are established at least in part as a result of the
different organizations and their cultures, norms, and interests rather than as a
result of the characteristics of the innovation process. Breakdowns in
information transfer and inadequate incentives to engage in incremental
improvements are difficult to avoid in collaborative models of production
because of challenges in appropriating the benefits from nonpatentable data.
Moreover, the goal underlying this approach often remains to push university
developments into the hands of the private sector, simply at later stages of the
development process. Where it is the private sector that is selecting and
directing development projects, even indirectly, the result is likely to be
underinvestment in projects that have a large net public benefit but lack the

199

See About Us, supra note 198.
Id.
201 Drug Development Sciences, U.C.S.F. DEPARTMENT BIOENGINEERING & THERAPEUTIC SCI., http://bts.
ucsf.edu/research/drug-development-sciences/ (last visited May 8, 2013).
202 MILNE & MALINS, supra note 114.
200
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promise of blockbuster profits. Moreover, there is likely to be less
experimentation with alternative ways of developing drugs, such as opensource drug development initiatives.
As universities develop innovation capabilities, their interests in setting the
drug development agenda, controlling the development process, and sharing in
the rewards of development are also changing. A few universities are now
experimenting with different ways to control a larger piece of the drug
development process. It is one such approach that is the subject of the case
study examined in Part III. This case study gives us the opportunity to explore
whether some universities may indeed offer any advantages over firms and
governments in managing post-discovery drug development and, if so, how
they need to change in order to do so. The implications of such an expanded
university role for the legal framework are explored in Part IV.
III. A CASE STUDY: EMORY UNIVERSITY AS DRUG DEVELOPER
Emory University has been actively engaged in academic drug discovery
and its efforts have resulted in a relatively high number of drug candidates.203
Part of its success is attributable to principal investigators on its faculty who
have both interest and experience in drug discovery.204 These investigators,
along with other members of the university community, are interested in
leveraging Emory’s expertise in drug and vaccine development to move
promising drug and vaccine candidates successfully through relatively late
stages of drug development.205 They want to move the university into areas of
the innovation process previously reserved for the private sector.206 They also
hope to attract a combination of public and private resources to push forward
innovations in important but neglected areas, such as finding cures for
203

See Stevens et al., supra note 188, at 539. A study published in the New England Journal of Medicine
in 2011 found that Emory University was the fourth largest contributor in the United States to the discovery of
new drugs and vaccines by public sector research institutions. This ranking was based on a comparison with
federally funded universities, research hospitals, and federal laboratories. Id.
204 See, e.g., Mary J. Loftus, The Dream Team, EMORY MAG. (Spring 2005), http://www.emory.edu/
EMORY_MAGAZINE/spring_2005/aids_sidebar.htm. The importance of role models for engaging in
academic entrepreneurship has been the subject of interest for a number of organizational scholars. See Janet
Bercovitz & Maryann Feldman, Academic Entrepreneurs: Organizational Change at the Individual Level, 19
ORG. SCI. 69, 70 (2008); Janet Bercovitz & Maryann Feldman, Entrepreneurial Universities and Technology
Transfer: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Knowledge-Based Economic Development, 31 J. TECH.
TRANSFER 175, 180 (2006).
205 See Mike King, Molecular Match Game, EMORY HEALTH, Spring 2011, at 2, 4 (describing the
motivations and goals of the Emory Institute for Drug Development).
206 See, e.g., Huryn, supra note 190.
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neglected diseases.207 This interest in neglected diseases is motivated both by
existing research capacity and by a desire to solve public-interest-oriented
problems in drug development.208 This group has spearheaded and helped to
fund the initiative described below, which for ease of reference is referred to as
the “Project.”209
The Project clearly falls in the third category of experiments discussed
above, involving university selection and ownership of, control over, and
responsibility for managing the post-discovery development process. While
various stakeholders may disagree on what “success” ultimately entails, the
Project must at a minimum achieve financial self-sustainability. It must also
advance medical therapies with an expected net public benefit in a way that is
consistent with the university’s public knowledge mission. If successful in
meeting these requirements, the approach to university innovation capacity
embodied in this Project could mark a new model for university-driven drug
development. If not successful, we can at least learn more about the nature and
source of the barriers that impede the transition of university discoveries into
products and move on to alternative strategies. The Project thus offers an
excellent pilot study from which to extrapolate ideas about how the
organizational structure of universities, as supported or impeded by the legal
framework, may be harnessed to expand innovation capacity.
This Part begins with a detailed description of the corporate and intellectual
property structures underlying the Project, with the goal of uncovering the
ways in which the characteristics of the university can support or impede
development activities. It then analyzes the potential of this approach as an
effective way of improving pharmaceutical innovation.210

207 See, e.g., Emory Institute for Drug Development Is Awarded the Global Health Primer, EMORY NEWS
CENTER (Nov. 7, 2012), http://news.emory.edu/stories/2012/11/global_health_primer/ (noting award of
“unique on-line resource that tracks drug, vaccine and diagnostic products for 25 of the world’s most
devastating yet neglected tropical diseases” to be managed and expanded by EIDD and to be used to facilitate
Emory’s “direct engagement with pharmaceutical companies, academic institutions, foundations and others
pursuing preventives, diagnostics and therapeutics for neglected diseases worldwide”).
208 Id.
209 The description of the Project is based on a combination of internal documents such as the Project’s
business plan, presentations made to the Emory University trustees, and descriptions of the Project provided by
its management and leadership team.
210 The description of the legal and corporate structure of the Project is drawn from the DRIVE business
plan, the organizational documents governing DRIVE and the Emory Institute for Drug Discovery, and
presentations prepared for the board of directors of Emory in May 2012.
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A. The Organizational Framework
Motivated by a key faculty member, Dr. Dennis C. Liotta, the governing
body of Emory University approved a plan for a self-sustaining, not-for-profit
operating model to translate scientific discoveries into global health solutions
in the spring of 2012.211 The stated goal of this plan was to discover and
develop therapeutic agents to treat infectious diseases, particularly viral
diseases, building on existing research interests and capabilities.212 The
proposal that Emory’s board of directors approved provides for the
development of three entities designed to work together to create a sustainable,
not-for-profit operating model for drug discovery and development. These
entities are wholly owned by Emory University, which is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit
organization, and the rules attaching to Emory pursuant to its 501(c)(3) status
cover the actions of Emory’s subsidiaries.213 But these subsidiaries have their
own distinct governance structures and supporting intellectual property
policies. Emory Innovations Incorporated, Drug Innovation Ventures, and the
Emory Institute for Drug Development were all developed using Bayh–Dole
funds generated from past successes with drug discovery.214 This funding
approach opens up interesting questions about whether the entities are now
also constrained by Bayh–Dole Act provisions, and if so, what these

211

Professor Dennis C. Liotta is the Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Chemistry at Emory University.
He has been a coinventor of a number of drugs, including Emtricitabine, which is a breakthrough HIV drug
marketed under the name Emtriva, widely used as part of the treatment for HIV-positive patients. Dr. Liotta,
along with other Emory faculty such as Dr. Raymond Schinazi, have helped to create a number of commercial
spin-off companies to further the development of their discoveries. Recognizing the considerable resources
that Emory University has in certain areas of drug discovery and development, Dr. Liotta has been pivotal in
pushing forward and providing start-up funds for the Project. See Dennis C. Liotta, Jim P. Synder, EMORY U.
DEPARTMENT CHEMISTRY, http://www.chemistry.emory.edu/faculty/liotta/ (last visited May 8, 2013).
212 See Emory Institute for Drug Development Is Awarded the Global Health Primer, supra note 207.
213 Emory University is a 501(c)(3) organization—an American tax-exempt nonprofit organization as
defined under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). This tax-exempt status is
accompanied by certain obligations, such as limits on the activities of the organization, reporting requirements,
and limits on how its assets are transferred. See IRS, PUB. 557, TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR
ORGANIZATION (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf.
214 Pursuant to the Bayh–Dole Act, universities must share with the inventor(s) a portion of any revenue
received from licensing an invention developed using federal funds. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B) (2006). Any
remaining revenue, after expenses, must be used to support scientific research or education. Id. § 202(c)(7)(C).
Emory University has an intellectual property policy that provides for a distribution of funds received from an
invention between the inventor(s), the department, the school, and the general university funds. The
inventor(s) have some discretion over how a portion of the department’s share is used. See EMORY UNIV.,
POLICY 7.6: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY § 7.6.05 (2011), available at http://policies.emory.edu/policy/
index_pdf.php?policy_number=7.6.

VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1

2013]

MAKING KNOWLEDGE AND MAKING DRUGS

6/3/2013 10:13 AM

793

constraints would mean in operational terms.215 The entities must become
financially self-sustainable before their seed funds run out.
The first entity, Emory Innovations, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary
company of Emory University.216 It operates as a holding company for a
single-member limited liability company called Drug Innovation Ventures at
Emory (DRIVE) and for what could be many future portfolio companies, each
directed toward a different innovation goal.217
The second entity is a single-member limited liability company called Drug
Innovation Ventures at Emory that has Emory Innovations, Inc. as its single
member. DRIVE operates as the business arm of the drug development system
and is organized like a virtual drug development company, with no internal
development facilities of its own. It has a management team drawn largely
from industry, with a chief executive officer experienced in commercial drug
development. It has an advisory board drawn primarily from industry, its own
employment objectives, and its own intellectual property policies, modeled
largely on standard commercial practices. The entity has full control over its
budget, but is also solely responsible for becoming self-sustaining once its
initial seed funding is exhausted. It will retain 80% of any net intellectual
property revenues earned up to $10 million and 60% of any net intellectual
property revenues earned beyond $10 million, such revenue to be used in the
continuing operations of the company in accordance with its mission. The
remaining percentage of revenue will go back to the university. This structure
marks a departure from the revenue-sharing model governing the university’s
mainstream research activities, a model that has its roots in the Bayh–Dole

215 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(C) (creating “a requirement that the balance of any royalties or income
earned by the contractor with respect to subject inventions, after payment of expenses (including payments to
inventors) . . . be utilized for the support of scientific research or education”). Part IV suggests ways in which
the legal framework should be clearer about the ability of universities to conduct drug development activities
such as those explored here.
216 Holding companies, sometimes created as subsidiaries and sometimes as separate affiliates, have been
used by many research universities to manage their intellectual property. See David C. Mowery & Bhaven N.
Sampat, Patenting and Licensing University Inventions: Lessons from the History of the Research
Corporation, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 317, 318 (2001); see also Sampat & Nelson, supra note 47, at 148,
151.
217 The use of holding companies, with separate projects run in subsidiaries of the holding company, is a
commonly used structure in many types of business activities. Reasons for this structure include tax
advantages, limiting overall liability of risky projects, and protecting core assets in the event of individual
project failures. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Transformation of Modern Corporation Law: The Law of
Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2005).
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Act.218 It allows for a much larger reinvestment of any proceeds made from
successful drug development back into drug development than would occur
under the university’s general intellectual property policies.219
DRIVE negotiates to obtain the development rights for early-stage
discoveries from Emory and from outside of Emory. It manages the drug
development process that starts with the discovery of a drug candidate and
moves from refining and optimizing this candidate through to Phase II clinical
testing. The business plan for DRIVE is to license potential drug candidates
from Emory University or from other academic or private institutions. DRIVE
will then contract with the Emory Institute for Drug Development and other
Emory-affiliated or third-party institutions or companies for drug development
services, and license out the resulting drug candidate to third parties such as
pharmaceutical companies once favorable clinical results have been generated.
In other words, DRIVE would push the drug candidate through the drug
development process until late-stage clinical testing and then move it into the
hands of commercial drug developers.
While DRIVE has a number of characteristics that resemble a private drug
development company, it diverges from an industry counterpart in important
ways. It is the wholly owned subsidiary of Emory University, a nonprofit
organization, and its decision-making structure gives weight to the research
and educational missions at Emory.220 While DRIVE is designed to operate as
a drug development business, because of its nature as a nonprofit organization
it is not constrained to focus only on profitable development opportunities. It
must become financially self-sustaining, but need not select projects based
only on their economic value.221 The company is expected to reinvest earnings

218 Under the Bayh–Dole Act, the university is required to share royalties from inventions developed
through the use of federal funds with its inventors. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B).
219 See EMORY UNIV., supra note 214, § 7.6.05. Under Emory’s intellectual property policy, any proceeds
from licensing are shared between the inventor(s), department, school, and general university funds. For
proceeds $4 million and above, the shares are 25% to the inventor, 33% to the department, 17% to the school,
and 25% to the university. See id. Up to 50% of the department share or a maximum of $500,000 per year may
be held in a discretionary account to support the inventor(s) lab expenses. See id. § 7.6.05(B).
220 See supra note 211.
221 While making a profit is not the mission of the unit, earning revenue is an undeniable part of its
continued existence and operation. The ability of this unit to balance concerns about revenue with the relative
social merits of alternative projects will depend largely on the resources it is able to attract and the
management decisions made by the entity’s CEO as influenced by the entity’s board of advisors and
constrained by the oversight of Emory’s board of directors. As a pragmatic matter, project choice will also be
influenced by the types of projects that present themselves and the types of investors that this Project is able to
attract.
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from out-licensing or sale of assets into new development opportunities that
are selected by its chief executive officer with advice from the advisory
board.222 The focus of DRIVE is thus on financial self-sustainability rather
than profit maximization. In addition, it is physically located in Emory and has
a governance structure that includes Emory personnel responsible to Emory
University as a whole. This physical and organizational proximity reinforces
the role of the university’s public knowledge mission in constraining and even
guiding project decisions made at DRIVE. It does so by increasing the
likelihood and ease of oversight over DRIVE activities by the university’s
governing body, and by reducing the contractual, intellectual property,
physical, and cultural barriers between DRIVE, the Emory Institute for Drug
Development, and the other parts of the university.
The third entity, the Emory Institute for Drug Development (EIDD)
established in 2009, has drug development capabilities designed to carry out
the kinds of tests and reporting needed to progress from an interesting drug
candidate into serious drug development.223 EIDD’s stated mission is to
“promote and support drug discovery research at Emory University, translate
promising technological advances from the bench-top to the bedside and train
future generations of pharmaceutical scientists by leveraging in-house drug
discovery and development expertise.”224 More specifically, EIDD is intended
to focus on the early-stage development of therapeutic agents to treat infectious
diseases, particularly viral diseases, which occur in populations throughout the
developed and developing world.225 This encompasses treatments that do not
have commercially viable markets, with the idea that given the lower margins
needed for this kind of model, funding might be attracted from public and
charitable sources. The focus of this institute is on small molecule therapeutics,
222 The selection of projects will be an area in which the tensions between public health and public
knowledge interests and private commercial interests become evident. While the university retains general
oversight, the board and other members of the university administration are not expected to intervene in daily
management and project decisions. Key researchers from Emory, particularly those instrumental to the
formation of the Project, will doubtless play an important role in project selection. Moreover, the selection will
depend on the opportunities made available both within and outside of Emory.
223 The EIDD has the capabilities to design and conduct nonhuman clinical testing needed to examine the
efficacy, toxicology, and other important properties of a drug candidate. It has significant physical and human
resources devoted to the preclinical studies needed to ascertain whether a drug candidate is ready for testing in
humans. Laboratory Capabilities, EMORY INST. FOR DRUG DEV., http://eidd.emory.edu/laboratory-capabilities
(last visited May 8, 2013).
224 Mission Statement, EMORY INST. FOR DRUG DEV., http://eidd.emory.edu/mission-statement (last visited
May 8, 2013).
225 World Health and Neglected Diseases, EMORY INST. FOR DRUG DEV., http://eidd.emory.edu/worldhealth-and-neglected-diseases (last visited May 8, 2013).
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and its lab spaces are scattered across the Emory campus to utilize both
Emory’s specialized resources and available space. The growth of this project
will take place in a pragmatic way, taking advantage of existing resources
within the university.
EIDD is technically organized as a department within Emory University,
but it is structured and operated in a manner closer to a private drug
development contract research organization than a traditional academic
department. It has the lab space, equipment, and personnel needed to conduct
preclinical activities that move from target identification through preclinical
activities. It does not have the capability to conduct clinical trials, however.
EIDD will not be funded in the way that traditional university biomedical
research activities are funded, which is largely through the use of NIH grants,
but rather will be funded on a fee-for-service type model. DRIVE contracts
with EIDD and other academic and commercial parties for drug development
services, and EIDD in turn can contract with third parties to provide drug
development services. Unlike other departments of Emory University,
employees of EIDD are not—at least according to the proposal for the
Project—governed by Emory intellectual property policies. They are hired as
non-tenure-track employees who assign their intellectual property rights to the
University without retaining a percentage share of any revenues generated by
their inventions.
EIDD retains important differences from its industry contract research
organization counterpart, however. As a department of Emory University, it is
subject to Emory’s general university policies, with the proposed exception of
Emory’s standard intellectual property policies. It is located on the university
campus in proximity to Emory’s research facilities and is integrated with the
Emory research and development community. Its leadership team is headed by
an Emory professor, and it is structured in a way that facilitates, and relies on,
collaboration with members of the Emory research community. Although
EIDD in its current form is unlikely to generate inventions, those that do
emerge would be owned by Emory University and managed by Emory’s Office
of Technology Transfer. This ensures that the university retains control over,
and responsibility for, the knowledge-intensive byproducts of development
work.
There are at least two distinctive features of this four-part structure (Emory
University, Emory Innovations, Inc., DRIVE, and EIDD), which differentiate it
from a private drug development company. The first feature is the governance

VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1

2013]

MAKING KNOWLEDGE AND MAKING DRUGS

6/3/2013 10:13 AM

797

structure, which tries to balance general university oversight with some degree
of autonomy for project-focused decision makers. University oversight of drug
development activities is provided at the board level. Emory Innovations, Inc.
has a board of directors appointed by the president of Emory that includes the
university’s three executive vice presidents. The board is required to include a
minimum of three and a maximum of seven members, with additional
members drawn from the university trustees and the Emory community. All of
the existing Emory University board governance parameters apply to the
Emory Innovations board. In addition, the operations of the entity and its
disposition of assets are subject to the restrictions imposed on its parent
company, Emory University, by virtue of its tax-exempt status as an
educational entity.226 What this means is that Emory University has ultimate
control over, and responsibility for, the activities of Emory Innovations, Inc.
and its subsidiary, DRIVE. Autonomy is preserved, however, by leaving
operations and management decisions to a chief executive officer and staff for
DRIVE and each additional subsidiary, with personnel drawn primarily from
industry. Practical decisions about innovation projects are made by the chief
executive officer with advice from an advisory board that is also drawn
primarily from industry. This distances decisions about project choice and
management from the central university decision-making structure. As a
contract research organization designed to pay its own way, EIDD is also
somewhat removed from the normal systems of academic governance and
central administration control despite its organizational status as a department
of Emory University.
Ideally, this governance structure means that the activities of Emory
Innovations, Inc. and its subsidiaries and the activities of EIDD will be
consistent with and supportive of the public knowledge mandate of the
university while also supporting efficient commercial development. The
autonomy left to the individual subsidiaries, however, combined with the
management focus on achieving financial self-sustainability, leaves open the
potential for project choices and project management decisions that reflect
localized profit interests rather than generalized public knowledge and public
health interests. Moreover, if the subsidiaries are successful in attracting
significant funds, this could influence how the university thinks about resource

226 These restrictions include limits on unrelated business income, limits on the amount of space that can
be devoted to commercial activities, and a requirement to run the entity’s operations in accordance with its
stated nonprofit mission. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
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allocation and intellectual property management. Discretion in this context is a
double-edged sword.
A second important feature of this structure is the way it partitions assets,
including intellectual property rights and projects. The partitioning of assets
and decision making may allow for the financing and operation of
economically valuable ventures that would not be feasible within the existing
organizational structure of the university. The creation of semiautonomous
management units may facilitate nimble decision making about specific
commercialization projects. Decisions about the drug development path can be
made faster, and with the focused goal of drug development in mind, when the
entity is operated and controlled by its own industry-trained chief executive
officer. Making decisions through the normal university channels, by contrast,
could be slow, cumbersome, and encumbered with conflicting interests and
incentives that are likely to interfere with effective development strategies.
Moreover, potential investors would be reluctant to invest in the development
process without some security that decisions would be made with their
development projects foremost in mind. Centralizing intellectual property
rights and management decisions necessary to post-discovery drug
development within such an entity will make this an attractive vehicle for
private investors, nonprofit funders with drug development objectives, and
collaborators.
This partitioning also has the effect of separating development resources
and decisions from the university’s central administration of funds and
intellectual property. In its current set up, Emory Innovations and its
subsidiaries will not be financed by general university funds. They are
supported with seed funds—albeit seed funds that are proceeds from the
licensing of Bayh–Dole-supported inventions—and must adopt a strategy to
become financially self-sustaining. Moreover, this plan involves a clean break
between the intellectual property policies that apply to discoveries made by
Emory researchers and those that apply to work performed at EIDD and other
entities that DRIVE contracts with as part of a drug development program.
DRIVE negotiates with the Emory Office of Technology Transfer for Emory’s
intellectual property rights based on discoveries made by Emory inventors, and
this license is negotiated by Emory in the same way a license with a private
party would be. Emory’s Office of Technology Transfer retains control over
decisions concerning the patenting and licensing of inventions emerging from
its faculty. Early-stage patenting decisions are thus, at least in theory, informed
by a broader range of both commercial and noncommercial concerns, rather
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than being driven by a single-product focus. DRIVE can also enter into
licenses and contract for drug development services with third parties, and
EIDD can perform drug discovery and development services for third parties.
This type of structure works by simultaneously partitioning and connecting
activities in the drug discovery and development process. By locating DRIVE
and EIDD within the university and making these entities a part of Emory, this
approach could not only facilitate interactions between drug discovery and
development personnel, but also lower the transaction costs of collaboration
with other parts of the university, as well as with other academic collaborators.
Physical and cultural proximity will help keep informal costs low and
organizational proximity will help keep legal costs low. Indeed, it is DRIVE’s
relationships with EIDD and the relationship of both DRIVE and EIDD with
other groups within the Emory University “family” that help to differentiate
DRIVE from a non-Emory virtual development company and EIDD from its
industry contract research organization counterparts. DRIVE and EIDD benefit
from their organizational and contractual ties to within-Emory collaborators,
such as the Emory Chemical Biology High-Throughput Screening Center,227
the Emory Vaccine Center,228 the Winship Cancer Institute and its Phase I
Clinical Trials Unit,229 the Atlanta Clinical and Translational Science
Institute,230 and the Yerkes National Primate Research Center.231 The
comparative advantage of universities over other private and public
organizations lies in part in the programs and facilities they can bring together
in this way under a connected and loosely coordinated umbrella.
227 See generally EMORY CHEMICAL BIOLOGY DISCOVERY CENTER, http://www.pharm.emory.edu/
ECBDC (last visited May 8, 2013).
228 See generally Mission Statement, EMORY VACCINE CENTER, http://www.vaccines.emory.edu/mission/
mission.shtml (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the Emory Vaccine Center, established in 1996 and one of
the largest academic vaccine centers in the world).
229 The Winship Cancer Institute provides a cancer research center for investigators from thirty-one
departments at Emory, as well as outside collaborators such as the CDC, to focus on basic and translational
research into cancer treatments. It includes clinical testing capacity. Winship Cancer Institute of Emory
University, EMORY WOODRUFF HEALTH SCI. CENTER, http://whsc.emory.edu/home/about/components-andfigures/Winship-cancer-inst.html (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the Winship Cancer Institute and its
clinical trials unit).
230 See generally About ACTSI, ATLANTA CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. INST., www.actsi.org/about/
index.html (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the Atlanta Clinical and Translational Science Institute). This
is a collaboration between the Morehouse School of Medicine, the Georgia Institute of Technology, and
Emory funded as part of the NIH CTSA program designed to integrate resources to pursue translational
research projects. Id.
231 See generally About, EMORY YERKES NAT’L PRIMATE RES. CENTER, www.yerkes.emory.edu/about/
index.html (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the Yerkes National Primate Research Center, which
conducts both basic and translational research).
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B. Analysis of This Approach
This Project diverges from mainstream approaches to university
involvement in drug discovery and development by extending the university
role to encompass financing and managing the drug development process
through the valley of death.232 Part II of this Article explained how universities
have organizational characteristics that may give them comparative advantages
over private firms in the dual process of creating knowledge and creating
drugs.233 These advantages included the ability to support a modular structure
that can accommodate different kinds of intellectual production and the ability
to provide the kinds of semipublic infrastructure, such as drug discovery
facilities, and the diversified human capital needed to increase translational
R&D capacity. The case study above gives us a more concrete idea of how the
organizational advantages of the university could be combined with existing
university drug-discovery capabilities to reach two related goals. The first goal
is to support socially valuable drug development efforts that private firms are
either unable or unwilling to engage in. The second goal is to produce a drug
development process that differentiates more effectively than private firms
between public knowledge aspects of drug development, which are made
publicly accessible, and private proprietary aspects of drug development, with
an emphasis on narrowing what is proprietary and how proprietary it really has
to be.
In the Project, the unique characteristics of the university, along with a
combination of organizational law and intellectual property law, are used to
design semiautonomous projects with their own governance structures that
together create a university-controlled process of distributed pharmaceutical
innovation.234 This design is essentially a “modularizing” or “partitioning”
232

Here the “valley of death” refers to the movement from selecting the most promising drug candidate
and refining the properties of that candidate through to Phase II of clinical testing. See MILNE & MALINS,
supra note 114.
233 These characteristics were described as: the ability of universities, as specialized entities with a public
knowledge function, to sustain different systems of knowledge production with varying levels of openness; the
disciplining influence of multiple stakeholders in the knowledge production process on university decision
making; and the flexibility, varying levels of autonomy, and alternative incentive schemes that are available
within the university’s relatively decentralized governance structure.
234 Eric von Hippel used the term distributed innovation to describe a system in which innovation
emanates not just from a central producer but from many sources including users and rivals. ERIC VON HIPPEL,
THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 5 (1988). Scholars such as Carliss Baldwin have explored the consequences of
modularity for distributed innovation. See Carliss Y. Baldwin, Organization Design for Distributed Innovation
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-100, 2012). Concepts such as task partitioning also provide a
useful conceptual framework on which to base an analysis of university-based innovation strategies. See von
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approach to the governance of mixed processes of drug discovery research and
drug development activities.235 Boundaries between the different entities in the
innovation process are based on the separable nature of different activities and
the need for varying degrees of openness and autonomy. The Project uses this
structure to: (1) pursue new funding strategies that include mixed public and
private funding; (2) minimize breakdowns in and restrictions on technology
and knowledge transfer; (3) respond to incentive problems that impede middle
stages of drug development and support reinforcing norms and cultures of
innovation; and (4) minimize the impact of commercialization activities on the
traditional research functions of the university.
To tackle the challenge of funding drug development, along with its own
operations, the Project creates separate entities with distinct projectmanagement and intellectual-property-ownership structures as vehicles for
creating attractive investment opportunities.236 There is a clean break in the
intellectual property rights and policies that apply to the university as a whole
and the intellectual property rights and policies that apply once intellectual
property has been in-licensed by DRIVE, the drug development company. The
idea is to partition those university assets, primarily relevant intellectual
property rights, which are essential to developing a portfolio of drugs.237 The
Hippel, supra note 136 (analyzing how the ways in which projects are partitioned into smaller tasks affects
innovation outcomes). A related concept is the use of patents to partition assets in ways that facilitate the
governance of private firms. Heald, supra note 133, at 480–84 (showing how patents may act as affirmative
asset partitions and resolve team production problems within firms).
235 The growing literature on modularization, property, and intellectual property has a number of
applications to this analysis. While a systematic application of the insights from this literature to analyze
partitioning approaches within universities is beyond the scope of this Article, the discussion here draws
directly and indirectly on much of this literature. See, e.g., Smith, Institutions and Indirectness, supra note 133
(applying information cost theory to IP and explaining how difficulty in measuring inputs and identifying
likely outputs creates advantages for placing a given activity within a module and giving control over local
remodularization to private actors, with IP allowing for this modularization through the right to exclude);
Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 133 (applying information cost theory to explain how intellectual
property works, albeit imperfectly, in addressing complex coordination problems of attributing outputs to
inputs); Baldwin & Henkel, supra note 133 (focusing on the link between modularity and value appropriation,
and the role of IP in this process); Baldwin & von Hippel, supra note 133.
236 This touches on a related and very relevant literature on intellectual property and the boundaries of the
firm, including work by Robert Merges, Dan Burk, Joe Miller, Scott Kieff, Paul Heald, and many others. See,
e.g., Burk & McDonnell, supra note 143 (examining the role of IP in balancing resource allocation needs
within the firm and between firms); Miller, supra note 143 (discussing the role of IP in allowing access lock-in
to facilitate the joint development and use of standards).
237 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Toward an Economic Theory of Property in Information, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 104 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011)
(discussing the asset partitioning function of intellectual property and other roles it plays in modular exclusion
strategies). Intellectual property law provides a modular platform for the interactions of parties, especially
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intellectual property license from the university to its development entity can
define the assets over which the development entity has control, using patent
rights as proxies for a cluster of information relevant to the development of a
particular drug or portfolio of drugs. This approach allows investors to identify
the boundaries of the projects they invest in and secures their investments even
when the inputs into the process are difficult to monitor and the outputs are
diffuse.238
Depending on the nature of the investors, which may include a mix of
industry investors, venture capitalists, philanthropists, and government funders,
the investors may be anticipating first rights to license any resulting drug
candidates, monetary returns, or in the case of nonprofit organizations or
government funding sources, progress of a drug candidate to meet targeted
health needs. The dual benefits of certain activities as both knowledge creating
and commodity creating can attract a combination of different kinds of
funding. Investors with diverging, noncompeting interests may be able to pool
their investments to mutual advantage, and they can invest in a portfolio of
project opportunities rather than basing investments on a single promising drug
candidate. The ways in which investments are made can be tailored to the
needs of different investors, although the ability of DRIVE to facilitate
different investor interests will be constrained by the existing legal framework.
Intellectual property rights not essential to securing investment in drug
development can be made available for broader public use.
Second, the Project can minimize breakdowns in and restrictions on
technology and knowledge transfer by tailoring the governance of internal
activities within each module or project to reflect the nature of the activities
and the nature of the knowledge being produced. Some activities will be well
suited to an open-commons or open-access research model, for example.239
when it comes to commercialization. Although exclusive rights have their costs—and because of the
nonrivalness of information itself these costs are more apparent in intellectual property than in property—the
modular bundling in intellectual property can serve to manage the complexity of coordinating rival inputs to
commercialization; the same basic architecture of defining a modular thing and using on/off exclusion rights as
a starting point, supplemented with rules of proper use, can be discerned even in IP.
238 For a discussion of the role of intellectual property rights in facilitating asset partitioning in ways that
support productive activity, see Heald, supra note 133, at 480–84, which suggests that just like organizational
law, intellectual property has an asset partitioning function.
239 See, for example, the proposed Archipelago to Proof of Clinical Mechanism (Arch2POCM) initiative
supported by the Structural Genomics Consortium and Sage Bionetworks, which aims to generate and
disseminate data about targets for cancer/immunology and schizophrenia/autism in a way that is IP-free with
the goal of improving the efficiency of drug development processes. See Stephen Friend, Sage Bionetworks,
Arch2POCM: A Drug Development Approach from Disease Targets to Their Clinical Validation (Nov. 2011),
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Other activities will require secrecy, again requiring accommodations at the
institutional level of the university. Boundaries between different activities, or
projects, can and should be designed to limit barriers to the flow of information
where it is useful, but also to create barriers to the flow of information where
proprietary uses dominate and public knowledge aspects are limited.240 We
care more about open access to early discoveries that reveal information about
disease mechanisms, for example, than we do about the toxicology results of a
particular drug candidate, although we may also care about the latter.
Boundaries can also be used to define tasks in a way that minimizes the
problem-solving interdependencies between the tasks and minimizes the costs
of cross-boundary problem solving where possible.241 This will be particularly
useful as drug discovery shifts from single-disease pathways to exploring the
molecular basis for groups of diseases.242 Organizing the innovation process in
this way may help to minimize breakdowns in the movement of knowledge
across different stages of development and can reduce costs in the creation and
flow of necessary information and technology along the drug development
path. It also allows the university to outsource those aspects of the drug
development process that do not draw on the university’s comparative
strengths.
Third, the governance of separate projects can be designed in ways that
respond to different incentive problems, such as eliciting effort levels in team
production processes and ensuring the right amount of information sharing
both within and across connected projects.243 Research-oriented projects must
available at http://www.slideshare.net/sagebio/stephen-friend-institute-of-development-aging-and-cancer-2011
1129.
240 The use of IP rights to create and navigate boundaries between different kinds of activities suggests a
distinction between what goes on within creative groups and between creative groups. For an exploration of
these ideas, see Katherine J. Strandburg, Intellectual Property at the Boundary (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/law/doc/patconpapers/Strandburg%20Paper20Draft.
docx.
241 See generally von Hippel, supra note 137 (exploring the link between how an innovation project is
divided into tasks (“task partitioning”) and the efficiency and effectiveness of the project; suggesting the
location of task boundaries may impact both the efficiency of task performance and project outcomes due to
associated changes in problem-solving interdependence among tasks).
242 See Collins, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that “diseases once considered quite distinct can share similar
molecular pathways,” which suggests future approaches based on cellular networks rather than individual
disease categories); Andrew L. Hopkins, Network Pharmacology: The Next Paradigm in Drug Discovery, 4
NATURE CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 682 (2008).
243 Various scholars have discussed the implications of different ownership structures. See, e.g., Burk &
McDonnell, supra note 143 (examining the effects of intellectual property rights on allocation of resources
within the firm, including allocation of rights between employers and employees and effects on specialization
versus integration of activities); Erika Färnstrand Damsgaard & Marie C. Thursby, University
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allow for peer review, publication, and replication by other members of the
scientific community. But more routine tasks generating results specific to a
particular drug candidate will need alternative review and monitoring
structures and may require restrictions on the publication of results. Using
varying incentive structures may also facilitate positive selection effects among
university employees.244 In the Project, different intellectual property
policies—including both ownership, benefit sharing, and disclosure rights—
apply to different units within the drug discovery and development system
based on the nature of the activities undertaken and the types of contributions
expected from these employees. General university intellectual property
policies favor inventors, rewarding them for breakthrough discoveries. This
may make sense for early-stage discovery efforts, but not for efforts directed at
making incremental contributions to the drug development process. Moreover,
it may impede the kind of immediate and free flow of information between
collaborating parties that is essential to efficient drug discovery.245 The
employer ownership model featured by DRIVE and EIDD, in contrast,
divorces the return to employees from their inventorship contributions, if any.
Employees have a bonus system that can be used to reward the production of
incremental improvements and to support team production efforts.
Along with individual incentive structures, norms and institutional culture
are also important in the success or failure of experiments like the Project. The
creation of separate entities contained within the university is intended to
create enclaves dominated by a more business-oriented culture. The norms and
institutional practices of academic research are different from the norms and
practices of industry research.246 The focus on and resources devoted to

Entrepreneurship and Professor Privilege, 22 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 183 (2013) (analyzing how differences
in institutional regimes regarding ownership of faculty inventions affect university entrepreneurship); Robert
P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1999).
244 See, e.g., Xuhong Su, Academic Faculty Affiliated with University Research Centers: Selection
Dynamics 3–4 (Apr. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2032787
(describing how recruitment of faculty typically involves providing incentives to encourage voluntary
participation).
245 See, e.g., Michaël Bikard, Is Academic Science Trapped Inside the Ivory Tower? Universities and
Science-Based Cumulative Invention (Apr. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://druid8.sit.aau.
dk/acc_papers/9hdurpx4qjhr1kbrde7hfg7dsved.pdf. Using a novel empirical strategy, Michaël Bikard tested
the relative impact of the academic and corporate environments on follow-on cumulative invention. Id. He
found that firms are a more prolific source of science-based inventions and that industry discoverers generate
three times as many cumulative patents as academic counterparts. Id. He also found that nondiscoverer
inventors draw scientific knowledge more from industry than academia. Id.
246 See, e.g., Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse That Roared: Hybrid Exchange Strategies as a Source of
Distinction at the Boundary of Overlapping Institutions, 116 AM. J. SOC. 341 (2010) (examining collision

VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1

2013]

MAKING KNOWLEDGE AND MAKING DRUGS

6/3/2013 10:13 AM

805

technological development, as well as linkages to innovation networks, vary
between academic and industry groups.247 Moreover, the individual incentives
of researchers within the university diverge from their industry counterparts.248
The university has deliberately created separate, self-contained systems in
order to create a more business-focused culture. Development entities such as
DRIVE are hierarchical, they have a focused leadership, employees are
selected in part based on their connection to a broader industry network and
their past experience as employees of pharmaceutical companies, and they
have clear product-focused objectives. Employment schemes and intellectual
property policies reinforce the business-oriented, technological-developmentfocused culture. DRIVE in particular is geared to the needs of a commercial
drug development process. Its officers are drawn from industry and its
advisory board is composed primarily of industry experts. EIDD is similarly
staffed with individuals that have industry experience in drug development.
They are hired not as faculty inventors, but as staff scientists engaged in
moving a drug candidate along the drug development path.
But while seeking to foster a distinct, product-development-focused culture
within the university, the design of the Project also seeks to limit the scope and
impact of the cultural divide. The cultural differences are constrained, and are
meant to be constrained, by the not-for-profit nature of DRIVE and EIDD and
the deliberate proximity and intentionally designed close interaction between
research and discovery personnel. EIDD includes both development employees
and researchers with Emory University faculty appointments, for example, and
DRIVE will rely on and bring together the resources of the Emory research
community around different development projects. In turn, the proximity of
academic scientists to development-focused projects might foster more interest
between academic and commercial science as exacerbated by patenting); Henry Sauermann & Paula E.
Stephan, Twins or Strangers? Differences and Similarities Between Industrial and Academic Science (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16113, 2010) (developing a framework to compare and contrast
academic and industrial science).
247 See, e.g., Bikard, supra note 245, at 6–7 (discussing the “ivory tower” view of universities, which
emphasizes that industry scientists have stronger incentives to develop new technologies based on the
scientific knowledge that they create, that the effectiveness of firm limits on dissemination of knowledge is
limited and that knowledge often flows between firms, that universities often occupy peripheral positions in
networks of innovative organizations, and that inventor collaboration networks are similarly distinct).
248 Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University
Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (2001) (suggesting that while academic institutions have dissemination of
knowledge as their mission, individual researchers often lack the resources and incentives to develop their
ideas beyond very early stages of discovery). There are also pressures on individual research scientists to
protect their research tools and early results in order to give them a comparative advantage in being the first to
publish on advances in the area.
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in, and desire to become involved in, pushing scientific discoveries into more
accessible forms. Ideally, the fact that these entities are owned by the
university and located within the university leads to greater balancing of public
access with private development incentives and lower organizational, cultural,
and legal barriers in the movement of knowledge between research and
development activities.
A fourth advantage of segmenting the different discovery and development
activities is to minimize the impact of commercialization activities on the
traditional research functions of the university.249 All of the activities take
place under the umbrella of Emory University, and the success of the Project
will require continuing collaboration with centers and departments within the
university as well as with its external academic collaborators. This interaction
must take place in a way that protects and supports the university’s public
knowledge mission. The hope is that the modularizing approach, pursued
within an overarching organization that retains oversight and responsibility for
the process as a whole, will provide an adequate balance of the public
knowledge and private development interests. Information can, at least in
theory, pass more easily between discovery and development entities due to
reduced organizational barriers, and intellectual property policies can be used
as a means of partitioning assets into commercial and noncommercial uses in
ways that can balance public knowledge and private development needs.250
Moreover, because the discovery and development activities take place within
a single organization, the university can make choices about when not to
protect information through the use of intellectual property rights as well as
making choices about the scope and nature of intellectual property rights that it
does obtain.251 Ideally, internalizing proprietary development and public
249 See generally Damsgaard & Thursby, supra note 243 (discussing the implications of institutional
choice including income sharing, investment in reputation, and ability to attract commercial partners); Jerry
Thursby & Marie Thursby, University Licensing: Harnessing or Tarnishing Faculty Research, in 10
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159, 166–67 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2010) (discussing
trade-off between harnessing tacit knowledge of faculty for development and diverting faculty from more
basic duties at the university).
250 This idea of using a modularizing architecture to strategically manage barriers and balance access and
appropriation interests in processes of innovation is drawn from a very different context—the strategic use of
modularity by entrepreneurial firms. See Carliss Y. Baldwin, When Open Architecture Beats Closed: The
Entrepreneurial Use of Architectural Knowledge 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-063, 2010)
(describing how entrepreneurial firms can use superior architectural knowledge to open up a technical system
to gain strategic advantage, identifying and modularizing and supplying key bottlenecks while outsourcing
supply of nonbottleneck components).
251 For the challenges inherent in managing information for the public good and the importance of
responsible knowledge management, see for example, Madison, Knowledge Curation, supra note 148.
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knowledge processes within a single organization, one that has a public
knowledge mission, will also reduce current industry problems of
underinvestment in information and undersharing of information that has a net
public benefit. The university does not have to worry as much about value
appropriation when designing the innovation process. This is because it at least
partially internalizes the public knowledge benefits and is at least partially
subsidized in its development activities. The university can select and engage
in socially beneficial projects and pursue knowledge-sharing strategies for
projects in ways that might not be attractive or available to private firms.252
Ultimately, the activities remain subject to the university’s oversight,
constrained by its overriding interest in ensuring that the public knowledge
mission of the university, along with its not-for-profit tax-exempt status and
valuable academic reputation, is not compromised by development
activities.253
Despite these notes of optimism about balancing public and private
interests to make both knowledge and drugs, the tension between public
knowledge and private development interests as universities pursue
development roles is a very real one. Managing the balance between
sometimes competing interests in public knowledge and product development
and preserving a strong foundation of disinterested, curiosity-driven science
remain the biggest challenges in pursuing a shifting university role in the
innovation process.254 The framework in its current form leaves open key areas
252 Universities may be better able to take advantage of modularity to create value because they do not
have to worry as much about appropriating the commercial value from collaborative activities, although the
ability to appropriate value still plays an important role in the optimal design of the system. Carliss Baldwin
and Joachim Henkel have discussed the relationship between creation and appropriation of value and the use
of IP to facilitate this process. See Joachim Henkel & Carliss Y. Baldwin, Modularity for Value
Appropriation—How to Draw the Boundaries of Intellectual Property 2 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper
No. 11-054, 2010) (“[I]n a modular system, a firm must simultaneously decide on the technical boundaries of
the modules and the IP deployed in each one. Controlling too much of the system’s IP is problematic if it
deters innovation by others. But controlling too little—or the wrong parts—may prevent the focal firm from
capturing value for itself.”).
253 Analogies can be drawn between the organizational strategies and objectives discussed here and efforts
to create a hybrid organization for social entrepreneurship goals. I suspect that efforts to use the L3C may run
into more problems than efforts at modularizing innovation within a university, but both approaches involve
inherent challenges as well as opportunities. For a critical evaluation of the L3C, see Rachel Culley & Jill R.
Horwitz, Profits v. Purpose: Hybrid Companies and the Charitable Dollar (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 272, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2055368.
254 Concerns about university involvement in money-making initiatives are not new. For influential work
highlighting the tensions between academic and commercial science more generally, see DEREK BOK,
UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2003), which
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of discretion in how the balance between competing public and private
interests is maintained, particularly in project selection choice and university
decisions about how to structure license terms with DRIVE, but also in broader
decisions about where to target growth in research capabilities.
IV. LEGAL RESPONSES TO A CHANGING UNIVERSITY ROLE
The challenges of making universities attractive sites for proprietary drug
development while also protecting their core public knowledge functions are
evident.255 Universities must seek to sustain and balance different cultures in a
way that promotes the health and vitality of both research and development
groups.256 They must wear a business hat while preserving their commitment
to a mission of public knowledge and education. They will have a growing
stake in commercial outcomes while seeking to preserve curiosity-driven
science.257 They will be conflicted in their approach to the disclosure and

examined whether everything in the university is for sale and argued that universities must be vigilant to avoid
compromising the primary mission and purpose of an academic institution. See also JENNIFER WASHBURN,
UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (2005) (arguing that
universities are selling out to corporate sponsorship and intellectual property is being transferred too readily to
industry). For a thoughtful review of the tensions between public and private interests in university science,
see STEPHEN M. MAURER, PROMOTING AND DISSEMINATING KNOWLEDGE: THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE INTERFACE
(2002). For a discussion of the tension that patenting may create with the university mission, see for example,
Geertrui Van Overwalle, Reconciling Patent Policies with the University Mission, 13 ETHICAL PERSP. 231
(2006), which examined how to reconcile the traditional academic mission of knowledge production and
science sharing with the current trend in universities toward knowledge protection and appropriation through
patenting and suggested mechanisms designed to provide oversight of conflicts and modifications to patenting
to respect public interests.
255 Concerns about the commercialization of academic institutions have been highlighted by scholars such
as Derek Bok. See BOK, supra note 254.
256 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This
Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION
POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223, 225 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). Other scholars
have a different view of the role of patents and industry partnerships on the dissemination and use of
biomedical discoveries, suggesting that patent rights may actually increase the sharing and use of research
results and support norms important to basic science. See F. Scott Kieff, Forum, Facilitating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 691, 694 (2001) (suggesting that patents may actually improve rather than dampen norms
supporting basic research, contrasting it with the imperfect operation of the market for “kudos,” and discussing
the positive effects of patents on encouraging more and broader forms of funding for scientific research); F.
Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001)
[hereinafter Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules] (noting the role of patents as property rights in
supporting commercialization of inventions by encouraging coordination and bargaining to achieve efficient
investment in and use of discoveries); see also Lee, supra note 67.
257 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology Transfer, in
UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL
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sharing of information and the management of early-stage patenting and
licensing because of their involvement as licensees and developers of these
same inventions.258 I have suggested that for some universities, those with
well-developed drug discovery capabilities, the social benefits of pursing these
dual activities may sometimes outweigh the costs. But to achieve these benefits
without jeopardizing the integrity and autonomy of academic science, policy
makers need to respond simultaneously to the frequently conflicting needs of
product-driven and curiosity-driven science. This concluding Part of this
Article suggests a few ways in which policy makers could use the legal
framework governing universities and their technology development and
transfer activities to respond more directly to the opportunities and challenges
of universities that expand their role in processes of innovation.
Concerns about the harm that commercial technology transfer activities
may have on the public knowledge functions of universities are not new.259
The existing literature includes detailed proposals for protecting the public
knowledge function of universities through patent law change. These proposals
advocate creating robust research-use or fair-use defenses,260 increasing control
PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 93, 97–122 (suggesting the importance of funding for curiosity-driven science
and the need to preclude researchers from using patenting to control follow-on research).
258 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh–Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289 (expressing concerns with the erosion of open science
and the increasingly proprietary character of university biomedical research and suggesting that federal
funding agencies should have more discretion in determining when to require that publicly funded research
discoveries be dedicated to the public domain).
259 See, e.g., MAURER, supra note 254 (noting the need for intervention to protect the public interest in
academic science, including a survey of activities by universities and governments that impact the public
domain); Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601 (2005); Rai & Eisenberg, supra
note 258, at 289, 313 (expressing concerns about inadequate motivation of universities to take social costs of
patenting decisions into account); Strandburg, supra note 257, at 97–122 (noting the importance of preserving
adequate funding for curiosity-driven research); Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms:
At the Boundary Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237 (2009) (exploring the
implications of convergence of academic research with commercial interests and the implications for norms of
sharing research tools and materials and suggesting need for policies to enhance sharing). Changes that
diminish the public knowledge orientation of universities could interfere with core organizational principles
such as autonomy, creativity, and diversity that are essential to the university’s public knowledge functions.
See, e.g., BUSCH ET AL., supra note 191, at 16 (“There are arguably three central principles and associated
practices that must stand at the core of any university that is worthy of the title: creativity, autonomy, and
diversity.”).
260 Numerous scholars have put forward detailed and carefully tailored proposals for research-use and,
even more broadly, fair-use defenses. See, e.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science:
Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 464 (2004); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1017 (1989) (proposing research-use defense that distinguishes between situations requiring payment and
those not requiring payment, with a focus on protecting robust domain for basic research uses); Donna M.
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by funding agencies over patenting decisions by universities,261 protecting the
disclosure of research results in the face of proprietary interests in restricting
disclosure,262 and limiting early-stage patenting and restrictive licensing
practices.263 The problems that these measures seek to address become even
bigger in a world in which university innovation capacity expands. But in
reconsidering the need for measures such as these, we also need to consider
whether they will impede or even foreclose potentially beneficial university
development roles.264 It may be difficult to encourage more private investment
in university development activities while also introducing a broad researchuse exemption for universities into patent law, for example. Moreover, the
Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European
Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1684–90
(2001); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2001); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward
a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (2000); Katherine J. Strandburg, What
Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 130–46 (proposing a
research-use exemption based on characteristics of the invention and distinguishing between experimenting on
a patented invention and experimenting with the patented invention).
261 Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 258 (advocating for greater NIH control over patenting decisions for
federally funded research).
262 See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their
Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 217 (2006) (proposing protections to disclosure norms by creating “an optin extended grace period that would provide more time for academic researchers to publish and present earlystage research before having to file a patent application,” combined with early application publication);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L. REV.
1363, 1363–404 (1988).
263 Various scholars have put forward proposals for requiring or encouraging open-access licensing and
supporting other modes of open science by universities. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Commons-Based Strategies
and the Problems of Patents, 305 SCIENCE 1110, 1110–11 (2004); Kapczynski et al., supra note 147, at 1090–
1109; Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917 (addressing the role
of public institutions in supporting distributed commons through ownership stakes and leverage from funding);
Lemley, supra note 259 (noting concerns that university interests may not align with optimal use of building
block inventions in nanotechnology); Van Overwalle, supra note 254 (suggesting mechanisms such as public
patents, open patents, and two-tiered licensing strategies as mechanisms for balancing ethos of sharing and
profit maximization in universities).
264 One set of arguments against public law interventions is that private actions may be sufficient to
protect public policy objectives. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: ConsiderationBased Regulation in Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 898–99 (2009) (suggesting that the increasing use of
conditional research support by government and nonprofit funders can be used to contractually construct a
biomedical research commons and reflecting the use of consideration-based contracting to effectuate policy
goals). Another set of arguments is that public law interventions such as fair use will introduce uncertainty, be
costly to implement, and will lower incentive costs and thus dampen innovation. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe,
The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 921, 950–51 (2006); Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The
Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169, 2176–85 (1991); see also Kieff, Property Rights and
Property Rules, supra note 256 (emphasizing the importance of property rights in encouraging
commercialization of inventions).
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organizational innovations behind university experiments complicate the
application of rules that rely on clear boundary drawing between commercial
and research activities. This is one of the main problems with the existing legal
framework—it works through boundary drawing instead of responding to the
governance challenges created by the dual nature of university research and
development activities.
As Emory University is discovering during the course of its experiment
with drug development capacity, there are a number of internal and external
rules and policies that create difficulties for funding university-driven drug
development. In addition, organizational strategies designed to support drug
development activities create new areas of tension within the university
between competing public and private interests and even between competing
public interests. This Article’s contribution to the policy debate is to focus
attention on ways in which the legal framework can improve university
governance of commercial activities rather than preclude them. While a
comprehensive blueprint for legal and regulatory change is beyond the scope
of this Article, it suggests some modest changes to the Bayh–Dole Act and to
tax rules impacting university-managed innovation that are designed to
enhance the governance advantages of the university in mixed processes of
research and drug development. This Part focuses in particular on changes in
existing rules that limit university strategies for financially supporting their
development activities, changes that can reduce tensions between pursuing
academic science and pursuing proprietary drug development, and collective
action problems among competing universities that may harm collective
innovation outcomes. Part IV looks first at whether the Bayh–Dole Act, in its
current form, might interfere with strategies for self-sustainable drug
development within the university.
The funding structure and legal rules governing university activities are
geared primarily toward supporting traditional forms of scientific research.265
The NIH and other federal funding agencies provide significant research
funding to universities, much of it in the form of grants made to principal
investigators for scientific projects that are selected through peer review by
other scientists.266 This system tends to reinforce existing patterns of research
265

See, e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 15.
See, e.g., JUDITH A. JOHNSON & PAMELA W. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41705, THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH): ORGANIZATION, FUNDING, AND CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES 6–7 (2011) (noting
more than 80% of NIH funds are spent on extramural awards and more than 75% of this amount goes to
researchers in higher education institutions, particularly the 131 U.S. medical schools).
266

VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1

812

6/3/2013 10:13 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:741

funding.267 Discoveries made at least in part using these federal funds are
subject to the requirements of the Bayh–Dole Act, which governs how
universities manage inventions that are developed at least partly through the
use of federal funds.268 As previously discussed, the Bayh–Dole Act was
designed to support the transition from publicly funded, publicly available
research into privately funded, proprietary research and development based on
a linear model of technology transfer.269 Universities could decide to elect title
to federally funded inventions provided that they took subsequent efforts to
patent and commercialize these inventions, typically through licensing to
industry.270 The Bayh–Dole Act avoided dealing directly with the tension
between public knowledge and private commercial development by presuming
that product development would occur in the private sector.271 Where the
university instead retains and begins to develop its federally funded inventions,
as intended in the Project, certain clarifications and modifications to the Bayh–
Dole Act such as those suggested below may be needed.
The Bayh–Dole Act requires that the university share funds from any
subject inventions with inventors, with the remaining funds to be used for
scientific research and education.272 It focuses on rewarding inventions, to the
neglect of valuable but nonpatentable improvements. As the Project suggests,
university proceeds from the licensing of inventions subject to the Act may
provide a natural source of funds for drug development. But it is unclear

267 See, e.g., Pierre Azoulay et al., NIH Peer Review: Challenges and Avenues for Reform (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18116, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18116.
pdf?new_window=1.
268 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006). For an extensive overview and review of the Bayh–Dole Act and its
implementing regulations, see SEAN O’CONNOR ET AL., LEGAL CONTEXT OF UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (2010).
269 One of the most significant legal measures is the Bayh–Dole Act, a 1980 amendment to the Patent Act
that allows research institutions to elect title to inventions that are produced using federal funds. Pub. L. No.
96-517, § 6, 94 Stat. 3015, 3018–27 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)).
270 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (amended 2011). For a discussion of patenting and technology transfer
activities by universities, see Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503 (2012).
271 See, for example, NIH discussions of preserving access to research tools in ways consistent with the
Bayh–Dole Act. The discussions focus on concerns with how universities will license research tools to the
private sector, and provides principles and guidelines to govern how universities make research tools broadly
available to the research community. See Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and
Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090
(Dec. 23, 1999); see also NIH Sharing Policies and Related Guidance on NIH-Funded Research Resources,
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH OFF. EXTRAMURAL RES., http://grants.nih.gov/grants/sharing.htm (last updated Mar. 5,
2013).
272 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B)–(C).
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whether drug development activities are encompassed within the statutory
meaning of scientific or educational purposes. In addition, the Bayh–Dole Act
in its current form may restrict the ability of the university to differentiate
between the revenue-sharing policies covering initial drug discovery, made
using federal funds and subject to the requirements of the Act, and those
covering later-stage incremental improvements on the same initial discovery.
Where research and development activities mix, and facilities, equipment, and
knowledge are shared between different projects, inventions made within a
proprietary-development-focused project may be considered “subject
inventions” and fall within the ambit of the Act.273 Even when research and
development activities are distinct, the continued development of a subject
invention may bring with it the continuation of Bayh–Dole obligations,
including its restrictions on how revenue is distributed and used. These
concerns about what is covered by the Act and how it impacts revenue flows
may limit the types of funding strategies that universities have available for
supporting drug development efforts, particularly efforts to secure private
investment in post-discovery development activities.
The Bayh–Dole Act also includes reserved rights to subject inventions for
government use.274 For any subject invention that the university elects title to,
the federal agency that provided the relevant funding “shall have a
nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have
practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout
the world.”275 The role of the government as a consumer of pharmaceuticals
through programs such as Medicare and Medicaid raises interesting questions
about the consequences of the Act for university-developed drugs. If the
university develops a drug, and the government is the primary purchaser of the
drug, can the government use its reserved rights under Bayh–Dole to argue that
it should not have to pay as much for the drug? Or at least should the
government be able to have a generic form of the drug made by a government
contractor? Where the government, through federal agencies such as the NIH,
is financially supporting research leading to the discovery of drugs, particularly
273 See id. § 201(e). The Bayh–Dole Act applies to “subject inventions” as defined in § 201(e),
encompassing “any invention of the contractor conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the
performance of work under a funding agreement.” Id. Where the university continues to work on a discovery
that is made using federal funds, and where the university mixes research that is federally funded with
development work that is not, questions may arise as to whether the results of the development activities are
subject to the requirements of the Act.
274 See id. § 202(c)(4).
275 Id.
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drugs that satisfy a critical health need, pressures arise on the government to
make the resulting drugs accessible and affordable, with or without the
cooperation of patent owners.276 The reserved rights for government use
provided in the Act are supplemented at the international level by provisions in
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), a key international intellectual property agreement, that allow for
compulsory licensing to meet public health needs.277 While reserved rights for
government use may indeed be important to protect public interests in access
to the fruits of federally funded research, the ways in which government use
rights can and should be exercised in the context of academic drug
development need to be further clarified.
This Article suggests that in order to harness the organizational advantages
of the university to solve problems of developing socially desirable drugs, the
Bayh–Dole Act should allow for the use of Bayh–Dole funds to support
university-managed drug development activities. Moreover, the university
should be able to draw a reasonable line between research activities covered by
the Act and development activities that are not subject to the requirements of
the Act unless the development activities are themselves publicly funded.
Where public funds are used for development activities, in contrast, these
activities should fall under the provisions of the Act. This would facilitate
different intellectual property policies and investment strategies for the
development entities in the Project, for example. In addition, clear guidelines
about how government use rights can be exercised should be developed with
the goal of balancing needs to attract private capital and needs to ensure access
to the resulting knowledge and drugs. These guidelines should be designed to
manage competing objectives, and they should be informed by accurate data
about the costs and benefits of alternative drug development processes and the
consequences of government use rights.
In addition to the Bayh–Dole Act, federal tax laws may limit university
strategies to fund their own drug development efforts.278 The federal tax code
276 See, e.g., Colin Macilwain, NIH Urged to Cap Profits Made on Publicly Funded Research, 406
NATURE 5 (2000); Taxpayers May Be Paying Twice for Some Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1994, at C3.
277 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement]. Article 31 of TRIPS addresses compulsory licensing.
278 For a general discussion of the problems inherent in the way that tax laws handle commercial activities
by nonprofit organizations, see John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 491 (2002). Issues discussed include how engaging in commercial activities may
impact the tax-exempt status of the organization, whether the income from these activities is taxable, and
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includes restrictions on the ability of universities, as nonprofit institutions, to
engage in commercial activities based on their nonprofit tax status.279 Even
when permissible, revenue from such activities may be treated as taxable
income.280 There are also other tax provisions specific to nonprofit
organizations, such as those accompanying the financing of university
buildings using tax-exempt bonds, which restrict the types of activities that
universities may engage in. Universities can issue tax-exempt bonds that yield
advantageous tax-exempt interest for bond purchasers. But the university must
use the funds and facilities financed by the funds in ways that are consistent
with Internal Revenue Service regulations in order to retain the tax-exempt
status of the bonds. This imposes significant restrictions on the private
business use of the university’s property.281 How drug development activities
will be treated and private interests measured when universities manage
innovation processes will be important in determining how much existing tax
rules restrict university innovation strategies. Matters become even more
complicated when the university wants to attract angel and venture capital
investors, who demand premiums on their investments, to fund drug
development efforts. Universities will likely need to be able to offer
commercially attractive returns to at least some private parties in order to
attract needed private capital for drug development projects. Philanthropic
capital may be increased if entrepreneurial donors can also participate
financially in the results of a university’s portfolio of drug prospects—a partgift, part-investment strategy that may attract donations from entrepreneurial
alumni. But the tax laws governing nonprofit organizations limit both
compensation schemes and the ways in which the assets of the nonprofit may

whether commercial activities by some entities within a complex organizational structure are imputed to other
entities within that structure. Colombo concludes that the laws governing these issues are a mess and need to
be fixed.
279 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
280 The tax code includes a definition of unrelated business income, which is income from activities
regularly carried on by the organization that are not substantially related to furthering the exempt purpose of
the organization. See id. §§ 512(a), 513(a).
281 See, e.g., id. § 145; see also IRS, PUB. 5005, YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS A CONDUIT ISSUER OF TAXEXEMPT BONDS (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5005.pdf. Federal tax law generally
requires that property that is financed by a nonprofit organization using tax-exempt bonds must be owned by
the nonprofit organization and must be used to further the charitable, educational, or other exempt purpose of
the nonprofit organization. Only an insubstantial use (generally less than three percent) of the property may be
for non-exempt or private business purposes. See, e.g., TAX-EXEMPT BOND PRIVATE USE MONITORING
PROCEDURES 1 (2010), available at https://www.finance.emory.edu/home/accounting_svcs/Fiscal%20
Accountability/FINAL%20PBU%20Monitoring%20Procedures.pdf.
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be transferred or disposed of.282 As this and other forms of public–private
partnerships become increasingly common and new financial models are
required to sustain them, tax laws that impede these models may need to be
revisited.
Overall, the tax rules that govern both the ability of universities to engage
in and the tax treatment of commercial activities need to be reevaluated in light
of their consequences for promising models of supporting university
innovation. In some cases the rules may need to be revised to ensure that the
university has the flexibility it needs to engage in financially self-sustainable
development work. This may include defining the purpose of the university as
encompassing drug development activity and careful consideration of whether
income from drug development activities that is reinvested in drug
development should be taxable. In other cases the rules may simply need to be
clarified to guide the university in its handling of different activities. While
there are costs associated with any such change to the tax code, at the very
least tax laws should be examined to determine their impact on university
product development and to assess whether the cost of change is worth
undertaking. Just how to get the balance of public and private concerns right in
adjusting, or not adjusting, these kinds of tax regulations remains a question
for further study.
In addition to difficulties in financing development activities, universities
also run into challenges in balancing the needs of academic science with the
needs of proprietary drug development. While protecting open access to and
use of scientific knowledge, the university also needs the ability to keep certain
kinds of information private and to restrict the use of certain uses of
intellectual property in order to secure the funding needed to push forward
drug development. While supporting autonomous, curiosity-driven scientific
research, universities also need to pursue more focused and centrally controlled
development approaches for promising drug candidates. The organizational
strategies discussed earlier in this Article seek to manage this tension through
the use of a modularizing or partitioning strategy. Projects will be separately
grouped and managed based on whether the interests of academic science
predominate, and rules of access and use will be devised accordingly. But there
are changes in the law that could go further in reducing the tension between

282 See, e.g., IRS, PUB. 4221, COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3) PUBLIC CHARITIES (2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221pc.pdf (discussing restrictions on private benefit and inurement and other
restrictions on how public charity assets are transferred and distributed).
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academic science and proprietary drug development. Avenues of change in
patent law suggested in the existing literature include giving longer grace
periods for inventions published in academic journals and later patented to
allow for publication.283 Changes such as this could be incorporated into the
Bayh–Dole Act for inventions produced using federal funding, since these are
the kinds of discoveries that are most likely to be the subject of academic
publications and the most in need of early disclosure and dissemination.
Research-use exemptions and other ways of protecting access to and use of
scientific knowledge may also help to maintain this balance, as discussed
further below, although the cost of such measures on drug development efforts
needs to inform the scope and implementation of any such measures.
The changes suggested above will provide universities with more discretion
and more flexibility in how they structure their drug development activities.
But increases in discretion and flexibility should be accompanied by increased
university accountability and responsibility for protecting the public interest
when managing development activities. As a start, universities should clearly
articulate their missions in the context of expanding innovation capacity and
should work together to establish best practices for university-driven
innovation.284 As part of this process, universities should work in collaboration
with their stakeholders, including members from the public and private sector
and from different constituencies within the university, to identify acceptable
experiments with university innovation capacity and to adopt guidelines for
engaging in development. They should find ways of building socially
beneficial innovation practices into traditional metrics used to evaluate
university performance. This governance-focused approach to managing an
expanded university role in development builds on recommendations made in a
recent report by the National Academies on universities and technology
transfer. The report emphasized the need for universities to place “IP-based
technology transfer squarely within the university’s core mission to advance
discovery and learning and to contribute to the well-being of society.”285 This
283 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 262, at 217, 254 (proposing protections to disclosure norms by creating
“an opt-in extended grace period that would provide more time for academic researchers to publish and present
early-stage research before having to file a patent application,” combined with early application publication).
284 Analogies can be drawn to efforts by university technology transfer managers to establish best
practices for university technology transfer in the form of In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in
Licensing University Technology. See, e.g., CAL. INST. OF TECH. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS
TO CONSIDER IN LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY (2007), available at http://www.autm.net/Nine_Points_
to_Consider1.htm. In the Public Interest is endorsed by a number of leading U.S. research universities and
provides principles to guide technology transfer decisions with the public interest and social benefit in mind.
285 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18, at 4.
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report went on to articulate the need for university accountability to ensure
compliance with this mission.286
Allowing universities to expand their role in commercial product
development activities should not be taken lightly. The idea behind these
proposed changes is not to encourage all universities to move into drug
development, but rather to allow for development activities by those
universities that may have a comparative advantage in socially beneficial drug
development, and to allow it only when they undertake the investments
required to manage the process in ways that protect the public interest.
Investment by both universities and policy makers in a system that will oversee
this balancing of public and private interests is an essential part of expanded
university innovation capacity.
Policy makers should therefore accompany increased flexibility to pursue
development activities with expanded monitoring and reporting requirements
for universities to ensure compliance with existing rules and with socially
beneficial goals. Both universities and policy makers should also explore
additional measures designed to increase the transparency and accountability
of the university as it engages in product-focused activities such as drug
development. The Bayh–Dole Act provides a natural place to begin instituting
more comprehensive and meaningful systems of reporting and monitoring drug
development activity. Current reporting requirements under the Act are tied
mainly to disclosure of subject inventions and brief summaries of how patented
inventions are being developed.287 These reporting requirements should be
expanded both in detail and in scope. Where substantial development activities
are undertaken, for example, reports should include a showing of how this
expanded role will further the university’s mission. Reports should include
details about how the development activities are financed and how they are
expected to progress. Where public funds support development activities, such
as the building of a high-throughput screening facility, reporting requirements
should extend to the management and use of these facilities. In addition, some
kind of meaningful review of university reports and university compliance
with their responsibilities should be implemented both within the university
and by an independent government regulator. Universities should have an
internal review process for new drug development projects and modifications
of existing projects that is transparent to stakeholders in the university. There
286
287

See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18.
See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (2006) (amended 2011).
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should be a public component to their reporting process. There should be
established lines of authority and accountability within the university to ensure
that university activities are consistent with the university mission and
performed in compliance with rules and regulations. University activities
should also be reviewed periodically by some kind of external, independent
committee, perhaps one comprised of members from public funding agencies
like the NIH, along with representatives from some of the main research
university associations.
The changes discussed above relate to the individual governance issues of
each university. This Article concludes with some ways in which the law can
address collective action problems that impede the sharing of research tools
and data. The competitive pressures on universities engaged in drug
development may discourage the kinds of industry-wide collaborations needed
to improve drug development efforts. Proposals for research-use exemptions
are worth revisiting in this area, at least in a limited way. I suggest that the
reserved rights for federal use of subject inventions provided in § 202 of the
Bayh–Dole Act could be amended to include not just government use, but use
by any research institutions for research use.288 Guidelines for what constitutes
“research use” should be established based on input from both public and
private stakeholders. This exemption would ensure a certain level of openness
to inventions useful in follow-on innovation even along proprietary
development paths. It would also address collective action problems faced by
the university community in making research tools and other discoveries with
broad applicability to further innovation available to the research
community.289 Critiques of expanding research-use exemptions highlight the
negative effects of such changes on private incentives to invent and invest in
commercialization, problems of over-inclusiveness, and the cost and feasibility
of making such changes to the patent system through either legislation or
common law.290 While these remain important concerns, it seems unlikely that
288 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) provides that “[w]ith respect to any invention in which the contractor elects
rights, the Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferrable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice
or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the world.”
289 Interesting questions arise as to the effect of such a change on the use of patented inventions for
research on U.S. entities versus non-U.S. entities.
290 See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 260 (discussing and evaluating objections to patent fair use); Katherine
J. Strandburg, The Research Exemption to Patent Infringement: The Delicate Balance Between Current and
Future Technical Progress, in [2 PATENTS AND TRADE SECRETS] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 107 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (discussing some of the
concerns with different kinds of research-use exemptions as part of argument in support of a research-use
exemption).
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the costs would outweigh the benefits for the following reasons. Many
university researchers already act as if there is a broad research-use
exemption,291 and as research and development activities merge, clear
guidelines clarifying what is and is not permissible might have a positive rather
than a negative effect on private incentives. Moreover, private actors are
themselves increasingly interested in sharing costs by collaborating in the
creation and use of research tools and in some cases contribute the results of
their research efforts to the public domain.292 As invention and innovation
become more collaborative and alternative open systems of innovation emerge,
a carefully tailored exemption may be favored by the private as well as the
pubic sector. Starting with a research-use exemption that is limited to
inventions developed with the use of federal funding would also provide an
opportunity to learn about how lines between research and nonresearch use
could be drawn and how such an exemption might function more broadly in
the law.
As the recent passage of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act
demonstrates, legal change is inevitably accompanied by uncertainties and
costs and often falls far short of the problems motivating the legal change.293
But this Article argues that these costs and uncertainties may be well worth
undertaking to bring the legal framework more in line with the modern
organizational challenges and opportunities facing research universities. This
Article has suggested some preliminary ideas for adjusting the legal and
regulatory framework to allow for changing innovation capacity in some of the
U.S. research universities while preserving their core public knowledge
functions. The adjustments proposed are relatively modest in scope, and deal
largely with ways of enhancing the characteristics that may make universities
comparatively good at managing at least some downstream stages of
pharmaceutical innovation.

291

See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19.
See supra Part II.
293 See generally Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). The Act was a result of years of congressional deliberations and is now the
subject of scrutiny and discussion by multiple constituencies trying to understand how the new rules impact
them. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patent Reform in the United States: Lessons Learned, REGULATION, Winter
2012–2013, at 20 (discussing limits of America Invents Act).
292
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CONCLUSION
U.S. research universities with biomedical research capabilities are
reconsidering the roles that they play in drug development as they both reach
for and are pushed further downstream in the pharmaceutical innovation
process. They are being pushed by funding needs and pulled by scientific
opportunities into experiments with university innovation capacity. They are
moving slowly and cautiously, interested to be among the leaders in attracting
new funds and prestige for innovative translational research models, but also
anxious to remain among the followers in deviating from traditional university
functions. In many cases, they have antiquated administrative structures and a
set of academic norms that are resistant to change. While the pace of change is
not rapid, organizational innovation in some of the larger U.S. research
universities is nevertheless outpacing innovation in the legal framework that
governs the role of universities in processes of innovation. To the extent that
universities are making changes in how they engage in technology
development and transfer, they are doing so against the backdrop of a legal
landscape that has remained relatively unchanged for the past thirty years.
This Article has suggested the importance of revisiting this legal
framework as universities expand their roles in the innovation process. The
case study of Emory University’s foray into a domain once reserved for
pharmaceutical companies illustrates the kinds of organizational changes that
such a move requires and highlights the tensions that may emerge in balancing
research and development activities and interests. Although universities may
offer unique advantages in supporting the kinds of knowledge production and
sharing that are critical to revitalizing pharmaceutical innovation, harnessing
these advantages in a financially sustainable, yet also socially productive way,
is challenging. Expanding the role of universities in product development
carries with it both costs and potential benefits. For the small number of
universities with established drug discovery capabilities who are already
heading in the direction of drug development, the benefits may outweigh the
costs if properly managed. The law should assist rather than impede these
universities in managing the balance of public interests and private
requirements implicated in making knowledge while also making drugs.

